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Conceptual and Theoretical Underpinnings in the Research of Corporate Political Activity: A Bibliometric Analysis¹

ABSTRACT

In this study, we focus on existing research of corporate political activity (CPA) in management and organization science. We systematically explore the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the research field by utilizing bibliometric analysis. The results identify several gaps in the extant research on CPA, implying that the field is incomplete and inadequate. Hence, we argue that the field needs the application of a wider array of theories and methodological approaches in order to increase and complement the prevailing knowledge. This study is an example of how meta-analytical research can assist research problematization and theory building in organization studies.

Descriptors: bibliometric analysis, theory building, corporate political activity, literature review

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1. INTRODUCTION

Recent literature has requested the extension of the knowledge of management scholars by synthesizing existing research findings and clarifying new directions for future research efforts through meta-analytical studies (Eden 2002). The benefits of meta-analytical research, i.e. research about research, are two-fold. First, it can improve the error and bias of research findings across a large set of replication studies (Glass et al. 1981; Hunter and Schmidt 1990; Hunter et al. 1982). Second, it has the ability to unveil grand theoretical constructs as well as the detailed theoretical relationships that prevail in a fragmented field of study, where the intellectual bases are neither self-evident nor uncontroversial (Oliver and Ebers 1998).

Bibliometric analysis provides a tool for systematically analyzing detailed conceptual relationships between published research articles. Rigorous bibliometric methodologies are needed to construct an understanding about the *de facto* structuring of a given research field, point out coherent clusters of research that can be used as reference points and identify knowledge gaps in existing literature. This 'homework' is necessary in order to position research problematizations, which is a key process in formulating research agendas aiming at theory building in organization studies (Locke and Golden-Biddle 1997).

Our study employs bibliometric analysis, specifically citation analysis, network centrality analysis and co-occurrence analysis (for methodology, see e.g. Oliver et al. 1998; Parvinen 2003), in order to make sense of the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the scientific discussion generated in the field of corporate political activity (CPA). Although we acknowledge that CPA as an inter-disciplinary phenomenon by nature has inspired a vast body of research conducted in several scientific disciplines, such as political science, economics and sociology (Boies 1989; Buchanan 1980; Clawson et al. 1992; Krueger 1974; Lenway et al. 1996; Mitchell et al. 1997; Mizruchi 1989, 1992; Munger 1988; Neustadtl and Clawson 1988; Pittman 1977), we limit our focus on the business management-oriented CPA research. Thus, our focus is on research that explicitly examines the actions and decisions of firms intended to have an influence on government decision-making.

There are two main purposes of the paper. First, we introduce a systematic account of the structure of the existing research in CPA. In doing this, our aim is to identify institutionalized streams of CPA research and to relate our findings to other recent CPA literature assessments (Shaffer 1995; Getz, 1997; Journal of Political Affairs, 1/2, 4/1: 2002). Secondly, by drawing several implications of the recent development of CPA research, we propose potential research avenues and provide information for future research problematization processes in this field.

2. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY OF CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY

CPA has been generally considered as a way to monitor, control, and manage the regulative pressures prevailing in a business organization's external environment. During the last two decades, the study of CPA has established itself as a distinctive sub-area of inquiry in management and organization research (Baron 1995; Baysinger 1984; Boddewyn 1988; Epstein 1980; Hillman and Hitt 1999; Hillman et al. 1999; Keim and Baysinger 1988; Keim and Zeithaml 1986; Mahon 1983; Mahon and Murray 1981; Rehbein and Schuler 1999; Schuler et al. 2002), having close intellectual connections to other sub-areas, such as corporate public affairs, issues management, and business ethics.

Several attempts adopting various perspectives have been conducted to make sense of this complex research field. Among the early contributors, Epstein (1980) noted that CPA research was primarily descriptive and atheoretical during the 1960s and 1970s. Preston (1986) identified the critical areas of conflict, controversy, and challenge in the study of business and public policy in the 1980s. Shaffer (1995) reviewed the empirical studies concerning corporate responses to government regulation by introducing different perspectives, research methods and levels of analysis used in earlier research. Vogel (1996) compared the accumulation of CPA research in political science and management science, concluding that the perspectives developed in these fields should be more fully integrated. More recently, Getz (1997, 2002) clarified the theoretical basis used in CPA studies. Schuler (2002), on the other hand, reviewed the primary quantitative methods used in earlier studies.

All these earlier contributions have clarified the content and progress of the field. They share two distinctive characters. First, they emphasize – explicitly or implicitly – that research on CPA has developed into a fragmented field of study. Second, they represent traditional narrative-based literature reviews that are typically qualitative and judgment-based accounts of the earlier literature. In this study, our aim is to extend and complement these earlier reviews by using bibliometric methodology in order to introduce a systematic and quantitative account of the existing CPA research in management and organization science. Compared to traditional literature reviews, our approach provides a more objective measure and thus enables one to investigate the structuring of the CPA research. In this respect, the extant literature is considered as a conceptual and theoretical network that can be analyzed in order to present a systematic and consistent view of the contents, structure and segmentation of the field of study.

¹ Note, however, that bibliometric analysis is not fully insulated from subjective bias, since for example the selection of articles incorporates some subjective judgment and the network analysis is entirely based on a subjective selection method, despite it being proven robust. For more on this subject, see Parvinen 2003: 13–14.

3. MAPPING THE FOUNDATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC FIELD BY BIBLIOMETRIC ANALYSIS

Bibliometric analysis is a generally recognized and widely applied method for identifying common research interests and theoretical foundations within a particular research domain (see, e.g. Lievrouw 1990; Paisley 1989; Pritchard 1969). The basic idea of the analysis is to "count and analyze various facets of written communication" (Pritchard 1969: 348). Thus, it is "a quantitative study of physical published units, or of bibliographic units, or of the surrogates for either" (Broadus 1987). Bibliometric methodology has been employed to "screen" several social science disciplines, e.g. inter-organizational relationships (Oliver et al. 1998; Parvinen 2003; Sobrero and Schrader 1998), organization studies (Usdiken and Pasadeos 1995), small enterprise research (Ratnatunga and Romano 1997), entrepreneurship research (Dery and Toulouse 1996), communication studies (So 1988), advertising studies (Pasadeos et al. 1998), public administration research (Toonen 1998), management information systems studies (Culnan 1986), and research and development literature (Tijssen and van Raan 1994). Adjacent to CPA research, Pasadeos and Renfro (1992) used bibliometric analysis to map the dominant features in public relations research during the 1970s and the 1980s. However, bibliometric analysis has not yet been used to systematically analyze and evaluate the prevailing state of CPA research.

In this study, we employ three distinctive techniques of bibliometric methodology, i.e., citation analysis (Cole and Cole 1973), network centrality analysis (Oliver et al. 1998) and co-occurrence analysis (Parvinen 2003). Following the rationale of bibliometric analysis, the empirical focus of our meta-analytic approach is not on the research findings, but on the research itself. Citation analysis, which is considered as "the best known and most widely used bibliometric technique" (Üsdiken and Pasadeos 1995: 508), is capable of revealing focal interaction networks and research fronts among scholars, and thus can provide information concerning the structure (types of dominant works) and boundaries (connections to other disciplines) of the discipline (Pasadeos and Renfro 1992; Üsdiken and Pasadeos 1995). Typically, citation analysis has been utilized to investigate journal articles and topics, authors and their affiliations, citation counts, and publication patterns (e.g. Kerr et al. 1977; Pasadeos and Renfro 1992; Podsakoff and Dalton 1987).

Compared to basic citation analysis, network centrality analysis, being a more recent and more sophisticated technique, allows exploring the theoretical and phenomenon-oriented conceptual roots that underlie a particular field of study. The aim of the analysis is to distinguish the key attributes of the earlier research by measuring their frequency of appearance and position within the research network. The network centrality analysis concentrates on exploring the content of actual studies in the field, and thus the focus of the analysis is on "the forest of research rather

than its individual trees" (Oliver and Ebers 1998: 550). Co-occurrence analysis, being a complement to network centrality analysis, reveals the interconnections between disparate constructs of the research field. In this sense, the network centrality analysis and co-occurrence analysis augment the empirical evidence of the structuring of the field provided by the citation analysis.

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 Database

The database for examining the current state of CPA research consists of empirical and theoretical articles published in 11 major organization and management science journals² between 1986 and 2002. Our intention was to select a representative sample that would cover the leading and established North American and European academic journals. In addition, we included one special journal (*Business and Society*) that is dedicated to publishing articles related to CPA. As a basis for journal evaluation, we relied on several studies that have measured the relative significance of management journals (Extejt and Smith 1990; Johnson and Podsakoff 1994; Sharplin and Mabry 1985; Tahai and Meyer 1999) and the rankings of the Social Science Citation Index, which annually ranks the most influential journals in organization and management science. Thus, we intended to include a wide range of influential journals from several sub-disciplines of management and organization science.

In the initial phase of the literature search, we selected a set of key words relating to the study of CPA in order to conduct an electronic search of the databases³. We found 684 articles that matched our initial query. Then, we carefully checked the abstracts of all these articles and were able to identify 71 potentially relevant articles. In the final stage of the filtering process, we intensively read through the remaining 71 articles and ended up with 43 articles that explicitly examined some aspect of CPA. The relatively small number of articles implies that the scientific discussion of CPA has not been flourishing in the most influential organization and management

² The journal sample includes Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Business and Society, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, Management Science, Organization Science, Organization Studies, and Strategic Management Journal. Note that we have intentionally excluded all managerial-oriented journals, such as California Management Review, Sloan Management Review and Harvard Business Review, although they are generally recognized as being influential in the field.

³ The key words were: 'antidumping', 'antitrust', 'business-government relations', 'campaign contributions', 'corporate political', 'influence', 'lobbying', 'nonmarket', 'political behavior', 'political imperative', 'political strategy', 'politics', 'protection', 'public policy', 'regulation', 'rent seeking', 'subsidies', 'trade barriers', 'trade policy'. We used the Abi Inform and Ebsco Business Source Elite electronic databases to search for the relevant articles. We limited the search to concern abstracts and titles of scientific articles, thus book reviews and editorial comments were excluded. The selection of the time frame (1986-2003) was determined by the limitations in electronic databases. Because of these limitations, it was not possible to conduct a consistent search of pre-1986 articles.

science journals. However, we argue that an in-depth examination of these journal articles can reveal the conceptual patterns of the most influential scientific discussion in the CPA domain, and thus offer a coherent and representative picture of the prevailing research on CPA in management and organization science.

4.2 Citation Analysis

The aim of the citation analysis in this study is to examine the intellectual foundations of the CPA research by analyzing three independent factors, i.e., the most cited first authors, the most cited texts (articles and books), and the outlet pattern of the published and cited articles. The fundamental logic of the analysis stems from the assumption that the most frequently cited authors and publications must be considered important by a large number of scholars in the field.

The outlet pattern of the published and cited articles provides a general picture of where and from which angles the CPA research has been built. Identification of the distribution of articles and references per journal is being used to complement the discussion of the development of the discipline and the relative importance of different research traditions in it. Furthermore, the outlet profiles are being used as a part of the explanation for the relative dominance of certain paradigms over others and to establish linkages between the paradigms, the authors, and the development of the field.

There are, however, some deficiencies in the citation analysis that have to be considered. First, due to the characteristics of the bibliometric data gathered from the electronic databases, only the first authors appear in the data, and thus the analysis focuses on the frequencies with which the first authors are quoted in the selected body of articles. This implies that authors with significant numbers of second- and third-authored articles are relatively under-represented. However, the simultaneous examination of the most-cited first author and the most-cited text analysis partly alleviates this deficiency. Whereas the most-cited first author analysis potentially downplays some of the findings, the analysis of most-cited texts accounts for all of the contributors. Thus, by combining the different analyses we are able to outline a more accurate and comprehensive picture of the Structure of the CPA discussion (see Parvinen 2003).

Another deficiency of citation analysis is related to the social dimension of referencing. In contemporary social science research, referencing is not only a way to indicate which sources have been used in the study, but it is also a social signal. For example, authors in organization studies use citing as a tool to construct intertextual coherence and demonstrate incompleteness, inadequacy or incommensurability of earlier research (Locke and Golden-Biddle 1997). Thus, the citation counts tend to ignore the context in which a particular citation is made. But despite its deficiencies, citation analysis has proved to be able to display valid views of a particular field of study (see Gordon 1982; Summers 1984; Üsdiken and Pasadeos 1995).

4.3 Network Centrality Analysis

The second part of the bibliometric analysis consists of network centrality analysis, by which we attempt to capture the conceptual dimensions and inter-relations of the prevailing research in the field of CPA. The target of the analysis is the intellectual content of a network comprised of the 43 selected articles. In this way, our aim is to explore the theoretical, methodological, and phenomenon-oriented patterns that underlie the current CPA research by measuring their frequency of appearance and position within the research network.

For the analysis of the selected body of literature, we first decided on seven facets that describe the various dimensions of the CPA-related articles (for the use of facet theory, see Oliver and Ebers 1998). Next, we selected a number of variables to describe each of these facets, with the intention to include all potential and essential dimensions of the facets in the analysis (see the full list of facets and variables in Appendix 1). Then, each article was coded according to 7 facets and 97 related variables in a binary matrix, in which the presence or absence of a particular facet in each article was denoted by giving it a value of 1 or 0, respectively. Similar to Oliver and Ebers (1998) we assumed a non-mutual exclusivity of the variables in each facet; in other words, practically any combination of variables in each facet (except of some variables in research design, e.g., static vs. dynamic) was allowed. Throughout the coding process we accepted only the variables that were central to a given article. For example, only the theories or concepts that laid the foundation for a given article were recognized.

To establish inter-rater reliability, two authors of this paper coded separately a random selection of the sample articles. For these 11 articles, out of 1067 codings, the inter-coder agreement was 89.4 percent for all variables, which we consider acceptable (cf. Collin et al. 1996; Oliver and Ebers 1998; Pasadeos and Renfro 1992).

The generated binary matrix displays the inter-linkages between the different facets and the articles. A linkage between two facets is created by their presence in the same article, and articles are linked to each other by a facet they share in common. In order to analyze the contents and dimensions of the CPA research network, we employ four measures: frequencies of facets, Bonacich eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1972, 1987), betweenness centrality (Freeman 1979), and co-occurrence analysis⁴.

⁴ In the co-occurrence analysis, a 97 x 97 matrix F consisting of the 97 facets on both axes (article number i: ai and dichotomous 0-1 variable number j:xj) was built by first initializing all elements Fij as zero. Subsequently, every article in matrix K was read for the presence of each facet. If variable xj appeared on the same row with variable xk, the corresponding matrix element Fjk was increased by one. Variable j assumed values 1, 2, ..., N and variable k values j+1, j+2, ..., 97. This procedure was repeated for all articles. The resulting matrix F displays the times that each facet appeared together in the data consisting of the 43 analyzed articles. The help of Mr. Lauri Ora (Cambridge University, UK) is gratefully acknowledged in designing and constructing the co-occurrence analysis.

Frequency measures, together with citation analysis, provide a preliminary understanding of the research field by indicating the relative dominance of different paradigms. Network centrality measures and co-occurrence analysis, on the other hand, provide a more extensive and indepth comprehension of the structuring of the CPA discussion (Oliver and Ebers 1998; Parvinen 2003). The network centrality measures analyze the centrality and bridging ability of the facets. According to the Bonacich eigenvector centrality measure, the centrality of a variable equals the sum of its connections to other variables, weighted by the centrality of each of these other variables (Bonacich 1972, 1987). Therefore, we calculate the eigenvector of the largest positive eigenvalue as a measure of centrality. The betweenness centrality measures the degree to which a focal variable is located on the shortest connecting path between any other variables (Freeman 1979). This is achieved by calculating the betweenness and normalized betweenness centrality of each vertex, arriving at an overall network betweenness centralization. The co-occurrence analysis reveals which facets co-occur most frequently with each other; thus it is possible to see whether facets actually appear in logical clusters or patterns (Parvinen 2003).

5. ANALYSIS

5.1 Citation Analysis

In this section, we employ citation analysis to evaluate the most cited authors, books, and articles

Table 1.
The Most Published Authors in the Sample

Author	Total
1. Schuler, Douglas	5,0
2. Rehbein, Kathleen	4,5
3. Hillman, Amy	3,5
4. Lenway, Stefanie	3,5
5. Shaffer, Brian	3,0
6. Keim, Gerald	2,5
7. Boddewyn, Jean	2,0
8. Cook, Ronald	2,0
9. Lord, Michael	2,0
10. Jacobson, Carol	1,5
10. Brewer, Thomas	1,5

Note: Total credits of the authors have been calculated as follows:

1st author = 1; 2nd author = 0.5; 3rd author = 0.33; etc.

in the research domain, i.e. the intellectual basis on which the scientific discussion in the field of CPA is grounded. A total of 2367 references in the 43 selected CPA articles were included in the citation analysis. The majority of these references (51.7 %) were made to journal articles, and the five most frequently cited journals represented the field of business management (*Academy of Management Review*, *Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of International Business Studies* and *California Management Review*). Although this implies that the intellectual basis of CPA discussion is heavily rooted in the field of business management, the journals of political science, economics, and sociology are also relatively well represented, thus indicating the inter-disciplinary nature of the CPA research.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the distribution of articles among the journals indicates a strong concentration of CPA discussion in *Business and Society*. One third of the articles were published in this journal. In addition, the paucity of CPA research in European-based journals (*Journal of Management Studies* and *Organization Studies*) alludes to the dominance of North American studies in the field. Indeed, more than 90 percent of the studies are published in American-based journals. Similarly, all of the ten most published authors in the sample come from North America (see Table 1). These results are consistent with statements made in earlier studies (e.g. Schuler

Table 2.
The Most Cited First Authors And The Most Cited Works

No. of Citations	Authors	No. of Citations	Works
66	Keim, Gerald	17	Keim and Baysinger (1988)
37	Boddewyn, Jean	17	Keim and Zeithaml (1986)
34	Lenway, Stefanie	17	Lenway and Rehbein (1991)
31	Mahon, John	17	Olson (1965)
31	Porter, Michael	14	Boddewyn and Brewer (1994)
28	Mitnick, Barry	14	Hillman and Keim (1995)
27	Hillman, Amy	14	Yoffie (1987)
26	Baysinger, Barry	13	Baron (1995)
23	Epstein, Edwin	13	Schuler (1996)
23	Rugman, Alan	12	Boddewyn (1988)
23	Schuler, Douglas	12	Epstein (1969)
22	Yoffie, David	12	Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)
21	Baron, David	12	Wood (1985)
21	Kobrin, Stephen	11	Baysinger (1984)
21	Olson, Mancur	11	Salamon and Siegfried (1977)
		11	Stigler (1971)

2002; Meznar 2002) that the field as a whole is missing a distinctive and coherent non-American perspective.

A more in-depth view on the structuring and the intellectual origins of a discipline can be provided by analyzing the patterns of most-cited first authors (Budd and Raber 1996). Table 2 reveals the dominance of CPA-related authors (11 out of the 15 most-cited authors are specialized on CPA research), *Gerald Keim* being as a clear leader of the group. The most occurring non-CPA author is *Michael Porter*, which indicates a strong intention to integrate the CPA discussion with general strategic management research. Moreover, several high-ranked CPA-authors are heavily oriented themselves to the research of corporate political strategy (e.g. Keim, Mahon, Baysinger, Baron). Another "cluster" can be detected among authors who focus mainly on managing international business and its government relations (e.g. Boddewyn, Lenway, Hillman, Rugman, Dunning). Besides the management approach, economics (by Olson and Williamson) and political science (by Stigler and Moe) are rather well represented on the list, whereas authors from sociology are non-existent. Another anomaly worth mentioning is the absence of the pioneering theorists in public choice theory, resource-based view and behavioral theory of the firm, although they all are among the most central theories applied in CPA literature (as will be indicated later in this paper).

A similar pattern, compared to the most-cited first authors' analysis, emerges as we explore the listing of the most cited books and articles in CPA literature (Table 2). However, a significant difference compared to the list of the most-cited first authors is that Mancur Olson's book "The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups" (1965) arises as the most cited reference. This implies that the concepts of collective action and free-riding hold a central position in CPA discussion (cf. Schuler 1996, who argues that "any theory of corporate political strategy must have a foundation based upon collective action theory"), but also suggests that scholars tend to cite only Olson's book when making reference to problems of collective action in CPA.

5.2 Network Centrality Analysis

In order to examine the content and construct of CPA research, we begin by analyzing the frequencies of appearance of all the coded variables (Table 3). According to our results, the main question that the existing literature has been trying to answer is *how* CPA is conducted and whether it is effective. This implies the prescriptive and instrumental nature of the research. Consequently, our findings are in contrast to Getz's (1997) assessment, according to which the foundation of current CPA research has centered on the *why* question (i.e., what is the rationale and motivation for engaging in CPA?). An explanation for this divergence may be found in the different approaches of evaluation. Getz assessed the type of questions that the various social science

Table 3.
The Frequency of Appearances of 97 Coded Variables in 43 Articles

Focus	Freq.	%	of 97 Coded Variables in 43 Articles Theories	Freq.	%
1. HOW	22	51,16	1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY THEORY	8	18,6
2. WHO	12	27,91	2. COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY	7	16,2
2. WHY	12	27,91	2. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY	7	16,2
4. WHERE	11	25,58	4. BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF A FIRM	6	13,9
5. WHEN	1	2,33	4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW	6	13,9
			4. ATHEORETICAL	6	13,9
Activity Measured	Freq.	%	7. INTEREST GROUP THEORY	4	9,30
1. NOT SPECIFIED	24	55,81	7. EXCHANGE THEORY	4	9,30
2. EXEC.LOBBYING	8	18,60	7. AGENCY THEORY	4	9,30
3. ELECTION FUNDING	7	16,28	10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY	3	6,98
3. PETITIONS	7	16,28	10. THEORY OF REGULATION	3	6,98
5. ORGANIZ. STRUCTURE	4	9,30	10. INDUSTR.ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS	3	6,98
5. ADVOCACY ADVERTISING	4	9,30	13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY	2	4,65
7. TESTIFYING	3	6,98	13. CLASS COHESION THEORY	2	4,65
7. CONSTITUENCY BUILDING		6,98	15. RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY	1	2,33
9. COALITION BUILDING	2	4,65	15. BARGAINING POWER	1	2,33
10. LITIGATION	1	2,33	15. STRATEGIC CHOICE	1	2,33
10. PUBLIC EXPOSURE	1	2,33	15. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS	1	2,33
12. BRIBERY	0	0,00	15. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS	1	2,33
12. CIVIL OBIDIENCE	0	0,00	15. GROUDED THEORY	1	2,33
12.01VIE OBIDIENOE	- 0	0,00	21.GAME THEORY	0	
Barrensh Barrens	F	0/			0,00
Research Design	Freq.	%	21. NETWORK THEORY	0	0,00
1. STATIC	32	74,42	21. HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM	0	0,00
2. EMPIRICAL	24	55,81	21. EVOLUTIONARY THEORY	0	0,00
3. PRESCRIPTIVE	23	53,49	21. CONTINGENCY VIEW	0	0,00
4. QUANTITATIVE 5. DESCRIPTIVE	21	48,84	21. CHAOS THEORY 21. ORGANIZATION ECOLOGY	0	0,00
	17	39,53	21. ORGANIZATION ECOLOGY	U	0,00
6. THEORETICAL	16	37,21		_	
7. QUALITATIVE	8	18,60	Antecedents	Freq.	%
8. DYNAMIC	8	18,60	1. TANGIBLE RESOURCES	18	41,8
9. COMPARATIVE	7	16,28	2. INTANGIBLE RESOURCES	14	32,5
10. ILLUSTRATIVE CASE	6	13,95	2. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE	14	32,5
11. CASE STUDY	5	11,63	4. EFFECTIVENESS	13	30,2
12. REVIEW	3	7,00	5. INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS	12	27,9
			5. LEGITIMACY	12	27,9
Level of Analysis	Freq.	%	5. DEPENDENCE	12	27,9
1. INTER-ORGANIZATION	23	53,49	8. GOVERNMENT REGULATION	10	23,2
2. INTER-INDUSTRY	7	16,28	8. CONFLICT	10	23,2
3. INTRA-INDUSTRY	4	9,30	8. ISSUE	10	23,2
4. MANAGERIAL	3	6,98	11. COOPERATION	9	20,9
5. INTRA-ORGANIZATION	1	2,33	11. INTEGRATED STRATEGY	9	20,9
			13. FIRM STRUCTURE	7	16,2
Context	Freq.	%	13. MARKET CONDITIONS	7	16,2
1. NATIONAL	25	58,14	13. BENEFITS	7	16,2
2. INTERNATIONAL	10	23,26	13.GROUP CHARACTERISTICS	7	16,2
3. LOCAL	5	11,63	17. BARGAINING POWER	6	13,9
			17. AGENCY	6	13,9
			19. INFORMATION	5	11,6
			19. PROFITABILITY	5	11,6
			19. COORDINATION	5	11,6
			22. MACRO-ECON.CONDITIONS	4	9,30
			23. GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION	3	6,98
			24. HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES	2	4,65
			24. RENT SEEKING	2	4,65
			24. SOCIAL WASTE	2	4,65
			24. TRUST	2	4,65
			28. COGNITION	1	2,30
			28. RESOURCE ACCUMULATION	1	2,33
			28. INDUSTRY DECLINE	1	2,30
			28. GROWTH	1	2,33

theories employed in CPA research typically address, whereas we explored the typical questions addressed in the published articles.

The frequencies of research designs employed in CPA research seem to indicate that the mainstream approach is to conduct empirical research with cross-sectional quantitative data in order to offer prescriptive implications. This view supports the assessments of earlier CPA literature reviews (see, e.g. Getz 1997, Schuler 2002). On the other hand, studies based on illustrative cases or qualitative, dynamic and comparative research designs have been less attractive to scholars. In terms of the level of analysis and context, the existing research clearly concentrates on examining CPA on an inter-organizational level in a country-specific environment. Moreover, earlier research has largely examined CPA as a general phenomenon without specifying any particular measure for CPA. In contrast, another tendency has been to construct a systemic model, in which particular activities are measured as a proxy for CPA (e.g. Hillman and Hitt 1999; Mahon and McGowan 1998; Rehbein and Schuler 1999).

In terms of theories and antecedents, the scholarly discussion in CPA research seems to have been built heavily on the concept of resource dependency, with resource dependence theory being the most applied theory, and tangible and intangible resources being the key antecedents. In general, the theoretical approaches generated in organization science and economics seem to dominate the scholarly discussion of CPA. Among with resource dependence theory, collective action and public choice theory are widely used theories, the former reflecting the abundant citations to Olson's (1965) book in CPA research. On the other hand, the public choice theorists are non-existent among the most cited first authors and references. Moreover, the key concepts of the theory, i.e. rent seeking and social waste, display only a peripheral role in CPA research. Similarly, industrial organization economics is a rarely applied theory in CPA research, even if its main representative scholar, Michael Porter, ranks high among the most cited first authors.

In addition to the frequency measures of appearance, the network positions of theories and antecedents were analyzed in order to determine their centrality within the CPA research network and the nature of their relations to each other. Table 4 indicates that resource dependence theory and collective action theory outperform all the other theories except the theory of regulation, in terms of both their centrality in the network and their bridging capability. In fact, the theory of regulation has the second best measure in betweenness centrality, although it is not very widely used and it is not central in the CPA discussion network. Moreover, exchange theory seems to possess a central role and a good ability to link theories that are not directly connected to each other, whereas resource-based view theory is typically used on its own: it ranks high in frequency, but is weak in centrality and linking measures. Thus, exchange theory may have a more essential role in the CPA research than its frequency of appearance might lead us to assume, whereas the less central position of resource-based view implies isolation from the rest of CPA

Table 4. Frequencies (%), Bonacich Eigenvector Centrality and Betweenness Centrality of Theories and

Antecedent	Freq. %	Eigenv.	Rank	Betw.	Rank
1. TANGIBLE RESOURCES	41,86	0,409	1	22,225	2
2. INTANGIBLE RESOURCES	32,56	0,354	2	11,101	7
2. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE	32,56	0,315	3	13,833	6
4. EFFECTIVENESS	30,23	0,223	8	28,717	1
5. INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS	27,91	0,266	5	6,271	13
5. LEGITIMACY	27,91	0,237	7	20,882	3
5. DEPENDENCE	27,91	0,276	4	9,548	10
8. GOVERNMENT REGULATION	23,26	0,169	12	10,940	8
8. CONFLICT	23,26	0,237	6	9,550	9
8. ISSUE	23,26	0,209	9	15,151	5
11. COOPERATION	20,93	0,191	11	3,188	15
11. INTEGRATED STRATEGY	20,93	0,166	12	3,441	14
13. FIRM STRUCTURE	16,28	0,200	10	15,851	4
13. MARKET CONDITIONS	16,28	0,121	17	8,271	11
13. BENEFITS	16,28	0,121	16	2,181	17
13.GROUP CHARACTERISTICS	16,28	0,120	14	8,192	12
17. POWER		0,137	18	1,106	20
17. AGENCY	13,95				
	13,95	0,132	15 10	2,704	16
19. INFORMATION	11,63	0,085	19 23	2,011	18
19. PROFITABILITY	11,63	0,069		1,934	19
19. COORDINATION	11,63	0,082	20	0,421	24
22. MACRO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS	9,30	0,070	22	0,823	21
23. GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION	6,98	0,081	21	0,578	22
24. HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES	4,65	0,050	26	0,146	26
24. RENT SEEKING	4,65	0,055	25	0,553	23
24. SOCIAL WASTE	4,65	0,036	28	0,321	25
24. TRUST	4,65	0,055	24	0,063	27
28. COGNITION	2,33	0,007	31	0,000	28
28. RESOURCE ACCUMULATION	2,33	0,010	30	0,000	28
28. INDUSTRY DECLINE	2,33	0,013	29	0,000	28
28. GROWTH	2,33	0,041	27	0,000	28
32. ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCE DEFICIENCY	0,00	-0,000	32	0,000	28
	Erog 9/	Eigeny	Donk	Date	Donk
Theory 1 RESOURCE DEPENDENCY	Freq. %	Eigenv.	Rank	9 917	Rank
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY	18,60	0,486	1	9,917	3
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION	18,60 16,28	0,486 0,429	1 2	9,917 12,083	3 1
RESOURCE DEPENDENCY COLLECTIVE ACTION PUBLIC CHOICE	18,60 16,28 16,28	0,486 0,429 0,362	1 2 3	9,917 12,083 4,083	3 1 5
RESOURCE DEPENDENCY COLLECTIVE ACTION PUBLIC CHOICE BEHAVIORAL	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334	1 2 3 4	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000	3 1 5 6
RESOURCE DEPENDENCY COLLECTIVE ACTION PUBLIC CHOICE BEHAVIORAL RESOURCE BASED VIEW	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129	1 2 3 4 10	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500	3 1 5 6 8
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000	1 2 3 4 10 15	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276	1 2 3 4 10 15 6	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333	3 1 5 6 8 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 9,30	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 9,30 6,98	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 12,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 12,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 2
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98 4,65	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 12,000 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 2 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 13. CLASS COHESION	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98 4,65 4,65	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155 0,094	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 12,000 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 9 2 9 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 13. CLASS COHESION 15. RATIONAL CHOICE	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98 4,65 4,65 2,33	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155 0,094 0,000	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9 11	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,080 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 12,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 13. CLASS COHESION 15. RATIONAL CHOICE 15. BARGAINING POWER	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98 4,65 4,65 2,33 2,33	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155 0,094 0,000 0,000	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9 11 15	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 12,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 9 9 9 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 13. CLASS COHESION 15. RATIONAL CHOICE 15. BARGAINING POWER 15. STRATEGIC CHOICE	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98 4,65 4,65 2,33 2,33 2,33	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155 0,094 0,000 0,000 0,000	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9 11 15 15	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,080 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 12,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 13. CLASS COHESION 15. RATIONAL CHOICE 15. BARGAINING POWER	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98 4,65 4,65 2,33 2,33	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155 0,094 0,000 0,000	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9 11 15	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 12,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 9 9 9 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 13. CLASS COHESION 15. RATIONAL CHOICE 15. BARGAINING POWER 15. STRATEGIC CHOICE 15. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS 15. COGNITIVE THEORY	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98 4,65 4,65 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155 0,094 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,042 0,000 0,000	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9 11 15 15 13 15 15	9,917 12,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 12,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 13. CLASS COHESION 15. RATIONAL CHOICE 15. BARGAINING POWER 15. STRATEGIC CHOICE 15. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98 4,65 4,65 2,33 2,33 2,33	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155 0,094 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,0042 0,000	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9 11 15 15 15	9,917 12,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 12,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 13. CLASS COHESION 15. RATIONAL CHOICE 15. BARGAINING POWER 15. STRATEGIC CHOICE 15. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS 15. COGNITIVE THEORY	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98 4,65 4,65 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155 0,094 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,042 0,000 0,000	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9 11 15 15 13 15 15	9,917 12,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 12,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 13. CLASS COHESION 15. RATIONAL CHOICE 15. BARGAINING POWER 15. STRATEGIC CHOICE 15. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS 15. COGNITIVE THEORY 15. GROUDED THEORY	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98 4,65 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155 0,094 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9 11 15 15 15 15 15 15	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 13. CLASS COHESION 15. RATIONAL CHOICE 15. BARGAINING POWER 15. STRATEGIC CHOICE 15. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS 15. GROUDED THEORY 15. GROUDED THEORY 21.GAME THEORY	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 4,65 4,65 4,65 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155 0,094 0,000 0,000 0,042 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9 11 15 15 15 15 15 15	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,080 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 13. CLASS COHESION 15. RATIONAL CHOICE 15. BARGAINING POWER 15. STRATEGIC CHOICE 15. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS 15. COGNITIVE THEORY 21. GROUDED THEORY 21. NETWORK THEORY	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98 4,65 4,65 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 0,00 0,00	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155 0,094 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9 11 15 15 15 15 15 15	9,917 12,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 12,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 13. CLASS COHESION 15. RATIONAL CHOICE 15. BARGAINING POWER 15. STRATEGIC CHOICE 15. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS 15. COGNITIVE THEORY 16. GROUDED THEORY 21. NETWORK THEORY 21. HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98 4,65 4,65 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 0,00 0,00	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155 0,094 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9 11 15 15 15 15 15 15 15	9,917 12,083 4,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
1. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 2. COLLECTIVE ACTION 2. PUBLIC CHOICE 4. BEHAVIORAL 4. RESOURCE BASED VIEW 4. ATHEORETICAL 7. INTEREST GROUP 7. EXCHANGE THEORY 7. AGENCY 10. NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 10. REGULATION 10. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS 13. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 13. CLASS COHESION 15. RATIONAL CHOICE 15. BARGAINING POWER 15. STRATEGIC CHOICE 15. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS 15. COGNITIVE THEORY 15. GROUDED THEORY 21. GAME THEORY 21. NETWORK THEORY 21. HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 21. EVOLUTIONARY THEORY	18,60 16,28 16,28 13,95 13,95 13,95 9,30 9,30 6,98 6,98 6,98 4,65 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,3	0,486 0,429 0,362 0,334 0,129 0,000 0,276 0,318 0,174 0,265 0,085 0,005 0,155 0,094 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	1 2 3 4 10 15 6 5 8 7 12 14 9 11 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15	9,917 12,083 4,000 0,500 0,000 2,333 5,083 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000	3 1 5 6 8 9 7 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

discussion. Furthermore, a relatively high number of the core management and organization science theories that are absent in the CPA research might indicate that the field is not necessarily as fragmented as it has been assumed to be in earlier literature. The strong emphasis on resource dependencies provides further support to this assessment.

The betweenness centrality analysis reveals three theories whose bridging ability clearly outperforms the other theories, namely collective action theory, theory of regulation, and resource dependence theory. Reflecting the inter-disciplinary nature of the field, the theories represent divergent disciplines, i.e., economics, political science, and organization science, respectively. Unlike the other two, however, the theory of regulation acts as a pure linking theory in the field. According to Oliver and Ebers (1998), there exist two contradictory interpretations to the role of linking theory. First, one could assume that the high betweenness centrality of the theory of regulation stresses its strength to attract and link complementary research and improve dialogue among otherwise unconnected perspectives. The other possible interpretation would emphasize the focal theory's weakness by arguing that it is not fully developed in order to be applied directly to the field of CPA.

Another interesting observation is related to the positions of resource dependence theory and exchange theory. As Getz (1997) has noted, these theories are closely inter-related, both making assumptions of power and dependency of actors. The more central position of resource dependence theory implies that the CPA research has emphasized business' dependence on government more than the mutual interdependence of business and government suggested by exchange theory.

In terms of the antecedents' network positions, intangible resources seem to have a low bridging ability, i.e. there is relatively little thematic integration between the various explanations for CPA. Conversely, effectiveness and legitimacy, two basic objects of measurement and generic antecedents to CPA, act as key linking antecedents together with tangible resources. Dependency is relatively more central but possesses less bridging capability, which can be thought to emerge from the relative centrality of resource dependence theory. An institutional constraint, as an antecedent, has a role similar to dependency, i.e. its linking ability is relatively weak.

5.3 Co-occurrence Analysis

In order to further deepen our analysis of the structure of the CPA research, we conducted co-occurrence analysis. With the analysis, we examine which theories and antecedents most typically co-occur with the most dominant theories and antecedents in the existing CPA research (Table 5). The analysis strengthens some aspects that emerged from the citation and network centrality analyses. It reveals that the field is divided into two identifiable theory clusters, one including collective action theory, resource dependence theory, exchange theory and new institutional

Table 5.

Co-occurrences of Theories and Antecedents with the Most Dominant Theories and Antecedents in the CPA
Research Network *

Facets: Theories and Antecedents	Most Common Co-occurring Theories	Most Common Co-occurring Antecedents
Theories**		
RESOURCE DEPENDENCY (RD)	CA, EXCH, NIS	DEPEND
COLLECTIVE ACTION (CA)	RD, EXCH, BEHAV	TANG, INTANG
PUBLIC CHOICE (PC)	INTGROUP, BEHAV, RD	TANG, EFFECT, DEPEND
BEHAVIORAL (BEHAV)	CA, PC, INTGROUP	TANG, DEPEND
RESOURCE BASED VIEW (RBV)	NO CLEAR DOMINANT THEORY	NO CLEAR DOMINANT ANTECEDENT
ATHEORETICAL	NONE	NONE
INTEREST GROUP (INTGROUP)	PC, RD, BEHAV	CONF, BARGAINING POWER, DEPEND
EXCHANGE THEORY (EXCH)	COLL.ACTION, RD, NIS	TANG, INTANG, DEPEND
AGENCY THEORY (AGCY)	NO CLEAR DOMINANT THEORY	AGCY, EFFECT
NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY (NIS)	RD, COLL.ACTION, EXCHANGE	NO CLEAR DOMINANT ANTECEDENT
THEORY OF REGULATION (REG)	NO CLEAR DOMINANT THEORY	NO CLEAR DOMINANT ANTECEDENT
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (IO)	NO CLEAR DOMINANT THEORY	INDSTR
Antecedents***		
TANGIBLE RESOURCES (TANG)	CA, BEHAV	INTANG
INTANGIBLE RESOURCES (INTANG)	CA, EXCH	TANG
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (INDSTR)	CA	TANG, INTANG
EFFECTIVENESS (EFFECT)	PC, AGCY	LEGIT, TANG
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS (INSTCONST)	CA, BEHAV, RBV	TANG, INTANG, COOP, DEPEND
LEGITIMACY (LEGIT)	RD, RBV, PC	INTANG, EFFECT
DEPENDENCE (DEPEND)	RD	TANG, GOVREG
GOVERNMENT REGULATION (GOVREG)	RD, RBV	DEPEND
CONFLICT (CONF)	INTGROUP, RD	TANG, INDSTR, COOP
ISSUE (ISS)	NO CLEAR DOMINANT THEORY	TANG, DEPEND
COOPERATION (COOP)	NO CLEAR DOMINANT THEORY	INSTCONST, CONF
INTEGRATED STRATEGY (INTSTR)	RBV, ATHEORETICAL	INTANG
FIRM STRUCTURE (FIRMSTR)	COLL.ACTION, RD, EXCHANGE	TANG
MARKET CONDITIONS (MARKCOND)	NO CLEAR DOMINANT THEORY	NO CLEAR DOMINANT ANTECEDENT
BENEFITS (BENEF)	PC	TANG, GROUPCHAR, EFFECT
GROUP CHARACTERISTICS (GROUPCHAR)	CA, PC, BEHAV	TANG, INDSTR, BENEF

^{*} Only dominant one shown if at least a two unit difference is present. If same score or only one unit difference, top three shown.

Discretion utilized in constructing this table.

^{**} Includes only the theories that have at least 3 occurrences (=frequency) in the network

^{***} Includes only the antecedents that have at least seven occurrences in the network

sociology, and the other consisting of public choice theory, interest group theory and behavioral theory of the firm. For example, collective action theory and resource dependence theory – the two most frequently used and central theories in CPA discussion – seem to be clearly the most co-occurring theories with both other theories and all antecedents. Moreover, exchange theory and new institutional sociology seem to frequently co-occur with both of these theories.

Furthermore, the analysis verifies the isolated role of the two strategic management—oriented theories, i.e. resource-based view and industrial organization economics, in CPA discussion. Although they are widely applied in research, none of the other theories systematically co-occur with them and neither do they co-occur with each other. Thus, these two theories seem to form two separate patches in the research field. Similarly, supporting the results of network centrality analysis, regulation theory is not dominantly used with some specific theory in the CPA articles, although it has a good bridging capability. Thus, it seems that the theory of regulation has been used as a complementary and linking theory, but not as a single theoretical foundation of research. However, the three most frequently appearing antecedents in the CPA discussion are typically examined in terms of collective action theory. This implies that scholars tend to argue that collective action problems in CPA are closely related to the amount of resources of a firm and the structure of a particular industry.

The co-occurrences of antecedents reveal that the conceptual foundation of CPA discussion has centered on firm-specific resources (both tangible and intangible) and industry structure. These concepts are clearly the most employed and they systematically co-occur with each other in the CPA research network. Moreover, the analysis shows that the concepts of legitimacy and effectiveness are closely inter-related, both dominantly co-occurring with each other in the existing research. This might imply that the earlier research, while attempting to identify the most effective political tactics, has also emphasized that the most effective activities should have a legitimate position within society. Another noteworthy conceptual co-occurrence pattern, although not surprising, is found between government regulation and dependency, which suggests that the dependence on government regulation has been seen as a focal explanation for CPA in earlier research. This finding is supported by the observed centrality of the resource dependence theory in the CPA discussion.

6. DISCUSSION

In this study, we integrated three distinct bibliometric methods, i.e. citation analysis, network analysis and co-occurrence analysis, in order to examine the intellectual foundations and various dimensions and their inter-relations in the network of existing CPA research. In comparison to the

earlier narrative literature reviews (Berman 2002; Epstein 1980; Getz 1997, 2002; Hillman 2002;

Meznar 2002; Preston 1986; Schuler 2002; Vogel 1996; Windsor 2002), we contributed a systematic view of the *de facto* structuring of the CPA research. Overall, the results of both the citation analysis and the network analysis indicated high congruence, revealing a research field that has generated a relatively coherent body of knowledge. Accordingly, "an internal paradox" seems to prevail in the field: although the field has multidisciplinary roots (Mahon and McGowan 1998; cf. the results of citation analysis in this study), the field itself has utilized a relatively homogenous and narrow range of perspectives. In our view, the results highlight four distinctive, although partly overlapping issues prevailing in existing research. These are the theoretical coherence vs. divergence in the field, the integration of CPA research into mainstream organization theory and strategic management literature, the methodological choices in studying CPA, and the role of international perspectives. In the following, we will discuss how our findings relate to the earlier assessments with these four issues, and what kind of theoretical and managerial implications our findings provide for the future development of the field.

In the earlier literature reviews, scholars have debated over whether the field needs theoretical coherence or diversity. Some scholars assert that the field is highly fragmented and needs a grand model of CPA (Schuler 2002; Windsor 2002). Similarly, it has been pointed out that the field is disorganized because the extant literature does not generate a cumulative stream of knowledge (Getz 2002; Meznar 2002; Vogel 1996). Hillman (2002) and Berman (2002), on the contrary, maintain that there is no need for a grand model that would incorporate all perspectives. In this study, we found that the discipline is conceptually abundant and interconnected, but theoretically scant and dispersed. In other words, the field lacks theoretical diversity and interconnectedness in the sense that there are two clearly dominant clusters of theories that are disconnected from other theories. However, even if we agreed that the most important objective of the field was to generate a grand model that would drive the accumulation of knowledge, we would argue that this also would require a use of diverse theoretical perspectives.

Furthermore, our results indicate that a remarkable fraction of the research is labeled as atheoretical, lacking explicit reference to a specific theory. This view is further validated by the relative paucity of theoretical contributors and contributions in the citation analysis. Accordingly, our findings support the assessment made by Getz (1997) that the initial emphasis on descriptive and atheoretical works in the 1960s and 1970s (Epstein 1980) has been "resurrected" during the 1990s. On the other hand, the relatively large amount of atheoretical research partly supports the view presented in earlier research that the field lacks an accumulation of coherent theoretical knowledge (e.g. Schuler 2002; Windsor 2002).

As the other major issue, scholars have emphasized the importance of integrating the CPA research into mainstream organization theory and strategic management literature (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994; Hillman 2002; Shaffer 1995). According to our results, this task is not yet

completely fulfilled (cf. Shaffer 1995: 511). For example, many established and widely applied theories in organization and management science (such as network theory, evolutionary theory, and organizational ecology) are absent from the CPA field. Furthermore, the concept of integrated strategy, i.e. market and nonmarket strategy (see, Baron 1995), seems not to be very central in the research field, thus implying an incomplete usage of the concept in the existing research. We argue that all this has a clear interface with the issue of theoretical congruence in the field. Namely, the integration of CPA research into the mainstream organization theory and strategic management literature may turn out to be a difficult task as long as the research field remains theoretically congruent. As noted by Hillman (2002), this kind of adherence to a few dominating theoretical perspectives is not intrinsic to other areas of management and organization literature (cf. Bartunek et al. 1993; McKinley et al. 1999; Pfeffer 1993). Moreover, several studies have noted that multiparadigm approaches that integrate disparate theoretical perspectives are essential in developing new insights to the organizational realm (Gioia and Pitre 1990; Lewis and Grimes 1999; Poole and Van de Ven 1989).

Parallel to the theories, the research field also indicates a high congruence in methodologies. A large part of the works has concentrated on researching CPA with cross-sectional qualitative data in order to offer prescriptive implications. Moreover, the dominant research design in the field includes an inter-organizational level of analysis in a country-specific environment. According to Shaffer (1995) this monotony in research design is largely explained by the limits of available data. Especially in the United States, large and easily accessible government records have induced scholars to construct research methods based on statistical analysis. Simultaneously, indepth case studies requiring access to firm-level data have been more unusual, partly because the data is more difficult to attain due to the secretive attitude of firms towards the issues of corporate political behavior. Despite these impediments, we argue that the field needs more research that utilizes longitudinal, firm-specific data. In this respect, historical studies based on company archives could be one possible solution to overcome the problem of data limitation. Moreover, studies focusing on processual and co-evolutionary approaches could extend scholars' knowledge of the dynamic aspects of CPA.

As to the fourth issue, the international perspective has been generally ignored or at least undervalued in the research field. It has been noted that the lack of international perspectives is a result of "ethnocentric bias" (Meznar 2002: 330), partly deriving from the research having been primarily conducted by North American scholars with North American data (cf. Getz 1997; Schuler 2002). Our findings in this study support this assessment: the discussion of CPA has been to date almost non-existent in European journals and all of the ten most published authors in the field are North Americans. Although there is a research stream focused on the relationship between governments and multinational companies (Blumentritt and Nigh 2002; Boddewyn 1975,

1988; Lenway and Murtha 1994; Mitchell et al. 1997; Rugman 1998), we argue that the real challenge of the field in terms of international perspective is to compare the political behavior of different firms in different country environments. Moreover, we encourage European (and other non-American) scholars to be more active in the future. As European scholars are generally perceived to have different methodological and theoretical perspectives in organization and management studies than North American scholars (Grunow 1995; Koza and Thoenig 1995; Pilkington and Liston-Heyes 1999; Üsdiken and Pasadeos 1995), it is conceivable that an increase in European research would enrich the understanding of CPA by enhancing the intellectual diversity in the field.

In this paper, we limited our focus to one specific sub-area of the study of business and politics in management science, i.e. corporate political activity. Moreover, we intentionally concentrated only on the vanguard scientific discussion in the field, excluding all managerial-oriented contributions and articles in several other outlets. Due to these strict limitations, the empirical data used in this study was relatively small, consisting of 43 articles. Although a critical reader might consider this as a potential weakness in terms of generalization, our sample covers the most influential discussion in the research area, and thus it can be considered to provide a representative picture of the whole field. There are, however, some statistical problems related to small sample size. For example, the frequency differences in several facets were minor, which means that some of the results are tentative at best.

Despite these limitations, we hope that our findings will spur additional theoretical and empirical works that will generate multivariate knowledge of this complex and multifaceted phenomenon. We believe that an increased diversity in the field has implications for both academia and practitioners. The former will gain new theoretical and empirical insights into corporate political behavior, and the latter will benefit from the diversity because both business managers and policy makers need multiple lenses in the interpretation of complex and turbulent environments.

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APPENDIX 1

Facets Used in the Network Analysis

Theories

- 1. interest group theory (e.g. Dahl; Schattschneider)
- 2. collective action theory (e.g. Olson)
- 3. public choice theory (e.g. Buchanan)
- 4. resource dependence (e.g. Pfeffer, Salancik)
- 5. **game theory** (e.g. von Neumann, Morgenstern; Axelrod)
- 6. exchange theory (e.g. Homans; Ekeh)
- 7. network theory (e.g. Wellman; Wasserman, Faust)
- 8. behavioral theory of the firm (e.g. Cyert, March)
- 9. historical institutionalists (e.g. Skocpol)
- 10. rational choice theorists (e.g. Shepsle, Weingast)
- 11. transaction cost (e.g. Williamson)
- 12. agency theory (e.g. Alchian, Jensen)
- 13. new institutional sociology (e.g. Meyer, Rowan)
- 14. bargaining power (e.g. Vernon, Rubin)
- 15. theory of economic regulation (e.g. Stigler)
- 16. evolutionary theory (e.g. Nelson, Winter)
- 17. contingency theory (e.g. Galbraith, Hofer)
- 18. resource based view (e.g. Wernerfelt, Barney)
- 19. industrial organization economics (e.g. Porter)
- 20. strategic choice (e.g. Rumelt 1984)
- 21. competitive dynamics (e.g. Schumpeter)
- 22. organization ecology (e.g. Hannan, Freeman)
- 23. chaos theory (e.g. Thietart, Anderson)
- 24. class cohesion theory (e.g. Westhues, Domhoff)
- 25.cognitive theory (e.g. Simon)
- 26. **grounded theory** (e.g. Glaser and Strauss)
- 27. atheoretical

Antecedents

- 1. **Firm-specific tangible resources** (focus on firm-specific resources, such as size and slack, explaining the probability and nature of CPA)
- 2. Firm-specific intangible resources (focus on intangible resources, such as contacts with politicians (access), credibility and managerial capabilities, explaining the probability and nature of CPA)
- 3. Firm structure (focus on firm structure, e.g. level of diversification/concentration, as an explanation for CPA)
- 4. **Industry structure** (focus on industry characteristics, e.g. size, high level of government regulation, high level of concentration, in determining the probability and nature of CPA)
- 5. **Group characteristic** (focus on problems of collective action (free riding) and its effects on the probability and nature of CPA)
- Cognition (focus on managerial cognitive understanding and sensemaking of complex businessgovernment relations)
- 7. **Government regulation** (focus on regulative power of government, such as generating imperfect market conditions, restrict free competition, creating uncertainty etc. in explaining the probability and nature of CPA)

- 8. Macro-economic conjuncture (focus on macro-economic factors, such as unemployment rate, balance of trade in explaining the probability and nature of CPA)
- Market conditions (focus on market conditions, such as import competition and export market conditions in explaining the probability and nature of CPA)
- 10. **Institutional constraints** (focus on country-specific institutional conditions in explaining the probability and nature of CPA)
- 11. **Information** (focus on the supply of and demand for information in explaining the probability and nature of CPA)
- 12. **Historical trajectories** (focus on the organization's past political success or failure in determining the probability and nature of CPA)
- 13. **Resource accumulation** (focus on the possibility to accumulate and generate new firm-specific resources through CPA)
- 14. Organizational resource deficiency (focus on the organization's financial problems as an explanation for CPA)
- 15. **Industry decline** (focus on industry based resource deficiency as an explanation for CPA)
- 16. **Profitability** (focus on CPA as a means for increasing or maintaining firm efficiency and profitability)
- 17. **Rent seeking** (focus on CPA aimed to achieve abnormal profits)
- 18. **Social waste** (focus on the effects of corporations' disproportionate political power to functionality of a society)
- 19. Business-government cooperation (focus on cooperation between government and business in explaining the probability and nature of CPA)
- 20. **Conflict** (focus on competition of various interest groups for government benefits and conflictual aspects of business-government relations indicating the probability and nature of CPA)
- 21. **Issue characteristics** (focus on policy issue characteristics, such as life cycle, salience and frequency as an explanation for the probability and nature of CPA)
- 22. **Geographic expansion** (focus on internationalization or entry to new markets as a motivation and explanation for CPA)
- 23. **Effectiveness** (focus on effectiveness and success of CPA)
- 24. **Growth** (focus on the role of CPA in the corporate growth by e.g. penetrating new product market or seeking for enhanced market power)
- 25. Legitimacy / ideology (focus on issues related to promoting firm legitimacy and ideology in society in explaining the probability and nature of CPA)
- 26. **Trust** (focus on CPA as a tool to create trust in business-government relations)

Appendix 1 (cont.)

- 27. **Coordination** (focus on issues related to formulation, implementation, and coordination of CPA inside the organization)
- 28. **Integrated strategy** (focus on the interconnection between corporate competitive and political strategy)
- 29. **Bargaining power** (focus on CPA as a means to gain political leverage over government)
- 30. **Dependency** (focus on the interdependence of business and government)
- 31. **Agency** (focus on CPA as a means to create and control agents in government)
- 32. **Expected benefits** (focus on expected benefits explaining the probability and nature of CPA)

Focus

- 1. **who** (aims to reveal the typical characteristics of firms that engage in CPA)
- 2. how (aims to reveal the typical tactics and
- approaches employed in CPA and their effectiveness)
- 3. **why** (aims to reveal the rationale of CPA, i.e. why firms engage in CPA)
- 4. **when** (aims to reveal the temporal variations of CPA)
- 5. **where** (aims to reveal the context in which CPA takes place)

Activity measured

- 1. petitions to government
- 2. executive lobbying
- 3. testifying in governmental legislation process
- 4. organizational structure
- 5. election funding
- 6. advocacy advertising
- 7. constituency building

- 8. coalition building
- 9. litigation
- 10. public exposure (pressure campaign)
- 11. civil disobedience
- 12. bribery
- 13. **not specified** (CPA examined as a general phenomenon including all possible actions and tactics related to CPA without specifying any of them)

Research design

- 1. empirical
- 2. theoretical
- 3. review
- 4. qualitative
- 5. quantitative
- 6. static
- 7. dynamic
- 8. descriptive
- 9. prescriptive 10. case study
- 11. illustrative case
- 12. comparative

Level of analysis

- 1. managerial
- 2. intra-organisational
- 3. inter-organisational
- 4. intra-industry
- 5. inter-industry

Context

- 1. national
- 2. international
- 3. local