# JUSSI KARHUNEN and MATTI KELOHARJU

# **Shareownership in Finland 2000**\*

#### **ABSTRACT**

This paper utilizes a unique database consisting of all electronically registered shareholdings of Finnish stocks by more than one million individuals and institutions. These shareholdings cover more than 99.99% of the total market capitalization of Finnish stocks. Using these data, the paper documents patterns in shareownership in Finland at June 1, 2000 and prior changes since 1995. The focus is on the following issues: (1) the breakdown of the number of investors and the proportion of aggregate investment wealth by institutional category; (2) the distribution of individuals' investment wealth by gender, age, mother tongue, municipality, province, and country of residence; (3) the distribution of IPO investors' gender and age; (4) the extent to which investors hold shares of companies headquartered in the investor's home municipality or province; (5) the concentration of individuals' investment wealth; (6) the number and socioeconomic attributes of individuals with at least one million FIM of investment wealth and how their number depends on the overall level of stock prices; (7) portfolio diversification; and (8) the relationship between a stock's ownership structure and exchange listing, industry, and market capitalization. Moreover, we report changes in ownership by investor category and changes in individuals' ownership concentration, diversification, and the distribution of ownership by province.

Key words: Shareownership, individual investors, institutional investors

JUSSI KARHUNEN, M.Sc. (Econ)

Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration

MATTI KELOHARJU, Professor

Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration • e-mail: matti.keloharju@hkkk.fi

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#### 1. INTRODUCTION

This paper presents a descriptive analysis of shareownership patterns in Finnish listed companies in year 2000 using data from the Finnish Central Securities Depository (FCSD). Moreover, the paper analyzes investments in initial public offerings (IPOs) and trends in the shareownership patterns. In many respects, the paper is an update of Ilmanen and Keloharju (1999) which looked at shareownership patterns in Finland at the beginning of 1997. An important difference between the papers is that Ilmanen and Keloharju did not investigate IPO investments. The present paper also provides a more detailed description of the portfolios and socioeconomic attributes of wealthy investors and a more comprehensive analysis of trends in the shareownership patterns.

Our study reports the following issues: (1) the breakdown of the number of investors and the proportion of aggregate investment wealth by institutional category; (2) the distribution of individuals' investment wealth by gender, age, mother tongue, municipality, province, and country of residence; (3) the distribution of IPO investors' gender and age; (4) the extent to which investors hold shares of companies headquartered in the investor's home municipality or province; (5) the concentration of individuals' investment wealth; (6) the number and socioeconomic attributes of individuals with at least one million FIM of investment wealth and how their number depends on the overall level of stock prices; (7) portfolio diversification; and (8) the relationship between a stock's ownership structure and exchange listing, industry, and market capitalization. Moreover, we report changes in ownership by investor category and changes in individuals' ownership concentration, diversification, and the distribution of ownership by province.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data. Section three presents the empirical results. Section four summarizes the findings.

#### 2. DATA

Our data include the initial balance in FCSD's shareownership records at January 1, 1995 and all changes in these records until May 31, 2000 for all publicly quoted companies represented in the paperless system of share ownership and trading, called the Book Entry System. At the end of the sample period, all but 2 domestic listed companies (Kylpyläkasino and SKOP) with more than 99.99% of stock market capitalization were represented in the Book Entry System; at the beginning of our sample period about 97% of the Finnish stock market capitalization was included in the register. In all, there are about 25 million initial balance records and

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changes of ownership in our data. Since all changes in the records are stamped on the day of transaction, these data allow us determine the ownership for each stockholder at any point of time between the above two dates. In this paper we analyze registered stockholder ownership records at seven separate dates: on January 1 from 1995 through 2000 and on June 1, 2000.

The Book Entry System entails compulsory registration of holdings for Finnish individuals and institutions. Foreigners are partially exempt from registration as they can opt for registration in a street name. This means that their stockholdings are combined to a larger pool of nominee registered holdings and cannot be separated from each other by scientific investigation.

We use the data to generate the following information for each shareholder and for each point of time:<sup>2</sup>

- Investor identification number: from 1 to 1,050,230. Individual investors are initially identified by their social security number and companies and other institutions by their official registration number. With the help of this unique number the shareholdings of an investor are kept separate from the shareholdings of other investors. For security reasons, in our data, the unique identifying number is replaced by a unique running number.
- Share class
- Number of shares
- Ownership type. FCSD classifies ownership into eight types of which only two have practical significance: private ownership and nominee registered ownership.
- Investor category. This identifies the line of business or profession of the investor. It is based on the 29-category system used by Statistics Finland. Our aggregation of the categories results in 11 categories or less.
- Dummy variables for males and females (individual investors)
- Birth year (individual investors)
- Mother tongue (individual investors)
- Zip code. We designate investors with a post office box number to the respective zip code.
- · Country of residence

In addition, the data allow us to compute IPO allocations by investor and stock based on the ownership change type. There are 50 IPOs with 179,630 different privately registered inves-

domiciled outside of Finland but have significant Finnish ownership. The two other foreign domiciled companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange, Eesti Uhispank and Hansapank, are not included in the Book Entry System.

<sup>2</sup> For more details of the data, see Ilmanen and Keloharju (1999) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000a, 2000b, 2000c).

tors in the FCSD sample. We compare the participation patterns in these IPOs to those from an older sample. The older sample is the same as that used in Keloharju (2000). It includes age, gender and zip code data from 85,384 investors who participated in 29 IPOs taken public by Kansallis-Osake-Pankki and its investment bank arm Prospectus between 1987 and 1994. Moreover, the older sample includes data on all subscriptions made by proxy in one large branch in the Greater Helsinki Area.

While our database includes comprehensive data on direct shareholdings, it does not cover indirect shareholdings. Therefore, for example, the holdings of investment companies owned by a single individual are considered to represent institutional ownership. For the same reason, we do not consider individuals' indirect ownership through mutual funds.

Many companies have listed two share classes one of which is attached with a greater number of votes than the other. This makes the stocks imperfect substitutes for each other and potentially gives rise to different owner clienteles. Therefore, we consider share classes with voting power differences as separate stocks. Unlisted share classes are not analyzed in the paper.

To put the data obtained from FCSD into perspective, we compare it to population statistics detailed in Statistics Finland's *Statistical Yearbook in Finland 1995–99* and on its web page and in *Finland CD 1998* database. Statistics Finland's data also allow us to aggregate zip code level information to municipality and province levels.

## 3. RESULTS

## 3.1. Distribution of investment wealth by investor category

Table 1 shows the number of investors and their investment wealth by investor category. Foreign investors are by far the largest investor category: at June 1, 2000, they owned 69.9% of the market capitalization. Foreigners' predominant role is largely due to their almost 90% ownership stake in Nokia which accounts for about two-thirds of the market capitalization on the Helsinki Stock Exchange; without Nokia, foreigners would have a 32% ownership stake in Finnish stocks. Domestic institutions own 20.2% and domestic household investors 7.0% of aggregate investment wealth. The remaining 2.9% is attributable to miscellaneous ownership categories and to investors whose institutional status is unknown.

The median investment wealth for household investors is 31,200 FIM, displaying a significant increase from 1997 when it was only 8,100 FIM. The investment wealth for the median household IPO investor is 72,200 FIM, suggesting that IPO investors are wealthier than investors at large. The most common investment, corresponding to median portfolio size, is an ownership of 150 stocks of HPY Holding (currently Elisa Communications). These ownership stakes

TABLE 1. Investment wealth by investor category at June 1, 2000.

Privately registered shares are registered in the owner's own name. Nominee registered shares are registered in a financial intermediary's name and the owners remain unknown. Only foreigners are allowed to register in a nominee name. 7 FIM = 1 U.S.\$

		Investors' mean	Median investor's	Sum of	Proportion
	Number of			investment	of total
Investor or ownership type	investors	wealth, 1000 FIM	wealth, 1000 FIM	wealth, mill, FIM	investment wealth
Categorization by ownership type:	vootoro	100011111	1000 1 1111		Water
Institutions	33 668	13 817.2	62.4	465 198	20.2 %
Males	396 544				4.6 %
Females	336 299				
Individuals total		221.4			2.4 % 7.0 %
	732 843				
Institutional status unknown	13 092				0.1 %
Privately registered foreign ownership	3 348				0.7 %
Privately registered ownership total	782 951	825.8	31.2		28.0 %
Nominee registered ownership				1 594 252	69.2 %
Other ownership types				64 643	2.8 %
Registered ownership total				2 305 484	100.0 %
Categorization by line of business or profession for	r privately registe	red ownersh	ip:		
Non-financial corporations	25 891	4 246.8	62.4	109 953	4.8 %
Deposit money and other credit corporations	310	10 983.7	1 086.7	3 405	0.1 %
Insurance corporations	107	541 874.2	583.8	57 981	2.5 %
Fin. auxiliaries and other fin. intermediaries	103	40 322.7	125.4	4 153	0.2 %
Financial and insurance institutions total	520	126 036.0	846.3	65 539	2.8 %
General government	428	385 398.0	126.4	164 950	7.2 %
Employment pension schemes	79	798 099.1	72 771.9	63 050	2.7 %
Other social security funds	34	157 501.9	553.5	5 355	0.2 %
General government total	541	431 340.5	210.0	233 355	10.1 %
Non-profit institutions	5 576	9 123.2	31.2	50 871	2.2 %
Employers and own-account workers	42 130	121.1	17.5	5 101	0.2 %
Employees	582 459	239.0	31.2	139 221	6.0 %
Other households	117 807	185.6	26.3	21 861	0.9 %
Households total	742 396	223.8	31.2	166 183	7.2 %
Rest of the world	4 064	4 098.7	40.8	16 657	0.7 %
Unknown	3 963	1 017.2	49.6	4 031	0.2 %
Privately registered ownership total	782 951	825.8	31.2	646 589	28.0 %

originate from ownership of one telephone share in the former HPY.<sup>3</sup> Without HPY Holding, the median household portfolio would be worth 19,100 FIM. As expected, households' mean portfolio, 223,800 FIM, is worth much more than the median portfolio. The difference between the mean and the median is driven by the fact that there are many investors with large ownership stakes.

**<sup>3</sup>** The former HPY was a telephone co-operative operating in the Greater Helsinki Area. Many people opening a telephone connection with the HPY bought a share of the co-operative which allowed them to buy telephone services at a discount. These shares were converted into common stock when the co-operative was transformed into a public company.

TABLE 2. Changes in investment wealth by investor category.

Note that the ownership fractions for privately registered ownership differ from those of Table 1 because here they are calculated relative to total privately registered ownership, not total registered ownership, and ownership. All ownership figures are from January 1 except that "June 2000" refers to June 1, 2000.

			1	Proportion of total investment wealth	of total inv	estment w	ealth				
								Excludir	Excluding Sonera, Helsingin Puhelin,	Helsingin P	uhelin,
•				Including all stocks	II stocks			æ	and HPY Holding	lding	
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	June 2000	1998	1999	2000	June 2000
Categorization by ownership type:											
Domestic											
Institutions	47.9 %	49.4 %	44.5 %	38.4 %	34.6 %	25.1 %	20.2 %	38.3 %	30.0%	18.0 %	14.6 %
Individuals	17.1 %	15.5 %	15.0 %	14.8 %	8.6	8.4 %	7.0 %	14.8 %	10.5 %	8.6%	8.3 %
Foreign ownership	30.3 %	31.7 %	36.9 %	42.4 %	51.1%	62.7 %	% 6.69	45.6 %	54.6 %	% 6.89	73.9 %
Institutional status unknown or other ownership types	4.7 %	3.4 %	3.6 %	4.3 %	4.4 %	3.8 %	2.9 %	4.3 %	4.9 %	4.5 %	3.3 %
Registered ownership total	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %
Categorization by line of business for privately registered ownership	d ownership	٠.									
Domestic											
Non-financial corporations	21.6 %	20.9 %	19.6 %	18.7 %	20.1 %	15.2 %	16.6 %	18.4 %	23.1 %	18.2 %	18.8 %
Financial and insurance institutions total	13.4 %	12.1 %	13.9 %	13.6 %	12.6 %	11.1%	% 2.6	13.7 %	14.7 %	15.0 %	12.2 %
General government total	27.4 %	31.7 %	29.2 %	27.1 %	35.7 %	39.9 %	34.8 %	27.3 %	25.5 %	22.7 %	20.1 %
Non-profit institutions	7.5 %	7.1 %	7.4 %	7.2 %	% 6.9	% 6.9	7.8 %	7.3 %	8.1%	8.6	10.4 %
Households total	21.2 %	19.8 %	20.6 %	22.6 %	18.7 %	21.5 %	24.6 %	22.5 %	21.8 %	27.1 %	30.2 %
Privately registered foreign ownership	5.1%	5.4 %	6.2 %	7.3 %	2.8 %	1.9 %	2.5 %	7.4 %	3.4 %	2.7 %	3.3 %
Unknown	3.9 %	3.0 %	3.1%	3.4 %	3.2 %	3.4 %	4.0 %	3.4 %	3.5 %	4.4 %	5.1 %
Privately registered ownership total	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0%	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %

Table 1 further investigates the distribution of investment wealth according to the categorization of Statistics Finland. The largest shareholders in terms of their fraction of total market capitalization are general government (10.1%), households (7.2%), non-financial corporations (4.8%), financial and insurance institutions (2.8%), and non-profit institutions (2.2%).

Table 2 shows how the distribution of investment wealth has changed across investment categories during the time period. Moreover, to take into account the stock exchange listings that probably have had the largest impact on investment wealth and its distribution across investment categories, we recompute the statistics at the four most recent points of time by excluding Sonera, Helsingin Puhelin and HPY Holding.

As expected, the results clearly show that the role of foreign ownership has steadily increased over time. Households and, to a lesser extent, non-profit institutions have experienced a surge in ownership fraction after January 1999, whereas the ownership fractions of non-financial corporations, finance and insurance institutions, and the general government have decreased. Households' increasing role can probably be at least partly explained by the listings of technology companies in which individuals as initial owners tend to account for a large fraction of ownership.

# 3.2. Joint distribution of age and sex and the relationship between investment wealth, age, and sex

Table 3 shows the joint distribution of age and sex for investors at large, for IPO investors in 1987–94 and 1995–2000, and for the entire Finnish population. Moreover, the table tabulates the gender and age distribution of investment wealth. The mean age of male investors is 47.9 years and that of female investors is 50.2 years whereas the corresponding numbers for the population are 37.5 and 40.8 years. In other words, male investors are on average ten years and female investors nine years older than the population average.

A comparison of the overall investor population and the IPO investor population suggests that IPO investors are younger than investors at large: male IPO investors are on average five years younger and female IPO investors seven years younger than investors on average at the time when they make their first IPO subscription. The average age of IPO investors in years 1987–94, 35.0 years for males and 35.9 years for females, is even lower than that for the 1995–2000 period.

One plausible reason for the change in the age structure of IPO subscribers is the much-discussed proxy subscriptions in the 1980s, which may have artificially lowered the average age of the subscribers. One important motivation for collecting proxies from others is to split a large order into several smaller orders. This allows large subscribers to take advantage of allocation rules, which generally have favored small orders (Keloharju (1993)). In many cases the

TABLE 3. Population, investors, and investment wealth by age and sex.

Investor age and investment wealth figures are from June 1, 2000 and population age figures from January 1, 2000. Half of the investors are assumed to have born during the first half of each year. The age of IPO investors is taken at the time of the first subscription. Millionaires refer to individual investors with at least FIM 1 million worth of shares.

			n	Individual investors at large	tors at large	١			Ē	Individual IPO Investors	nvestors	
	Popu	Population	# of in	of investors	Investment wealth	nt wealth	# of mill	of millionaires	1987-1994	1994	1995-2000	000
Age	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
-06	0.1%		0.3 %	0.5 %	% 2.0	% 8.0	1.6 %	1.5 %	% 0.0	% 0.0	1.1%	1.0 %
85-89	0.3 %		% 9.0		1.3 %	1.1%	1.8 %	1.7 %	% 0.0	% 0.0	1.0 %	% 6:0
80-84	0.5 %		1.1%	1.5 %	1.9 %	1.8 %	2.8 %	2.8 %	0.1%	0.5 %	1.3 %	1.1%
75-79	1.1%		2.0 %	2.3 %	3.1 %	4.0 %	4.1 %	3.8 %	0.3 %	0.3 %	1.8 %	1.0 %
70-74	1.7 %		2.9 %		3.9 %	2.7 %	5.3 %	3.7 %	% 9.0	0.5 %	4.6 %	1.7 %
62-69	2.0 %	2.4 %	3.5 %	3.1%	6.5 %	2.6 %	5.9 %	3.2 %	1.1 %	0.7 %	6.1 %	2.3 %
60-64	2.4 %		4.4 %	3.7 %	2.0 %	2.9 %	6.3 %	3.4 %	1.9 %	1.1 %	7.0 %	3.0 %
55-59	2.7 %		2.6 %	4.7 %	7.7 %	4.3 %	8.9 %	4.3 %	3.1 %	1.9 %	% 0.9	2.7 %
50-54	4.1%		6.7 %	5.4 %	9.3 %	4.1%	8.9 %	3.8 %	4.5 %	2.5 %	6.1%	2.9 %
45-49	4.0%		2.0 %	4.1%	6.1 %	2.8 %	5.3 %	2.3 %	6.1 %	3.3 %	6.7 %	3.4 %
40-44	3.8 %		4.4 %	3.4 %	2.5 %	1.7 %	3.8 %	1.7 %	8.7 %	4.5 %	7.9 %	4.5 %
35-39	3.8 %		4.3 %	3.3 %	4.4 %	1.5 %	2.9 %	1.2 %	7.5 %	4.0 %	5.5 %	3.2 %
30-34	3.5 %		3.9 %	2.9 %	2.9 %	1.3 %	1.8 %	1.1%	8.9	3.4 %	4.4 %	2.5 %
25-29	3.0 %		3.2 %	2.3 %	1.8 %	1.0 %	1.3 %	%8.0	7.3 %	3.6 %	2.9 %	1.7 %
20-24	3.2 %		2.4 %	1.7 %	1.1%	%8.0	% 6:0	0.7 %	% 2.9	3.6 %	1.9 %	1.2 %
15-19	3.3 %		1.8 %	1.4 %	% 8.0	0.5 %	0.7 %	% 9.0	3.0 %	1.9 %	% 6.0	% 9.0
10-14	3.1%		1.1%	% 6:0	0.4 %	0.3 %	0.4 %	0.3 %	2.1 %	1.9 %	0.4 %	0.3 %
5-9	3.2 %		0.7 %	% 9.0	0.2 %	0.2 %	0.1%	0.1%	1.8 %	1.7 %	0.1%	0.1%
0-4	2.9 %		0.4 %	0.3 %	0.1 %	0.1%	% 0.0	% 0.0	1.6 %	1.3 %	0.1%	0.1%
Totals	48.8 %	51.2 %	54.1 %	45.9 %	65.4 %	34.6 %	62.9 %	37.1 %	63.4 %	36.6 %	% 0.99	34.0 %
Mean age	37.5	40.8	47.9	50.2			57.8	6.09	35.0	35.9	42.3	43.1

receiver of the proxy, not the proxy issuer, has been the actual end investor. Large-scale use of proxies was probably much less common in the 1990s.

Keloharju (2000) examines the use of proxies in the 1980s by collecting data of their actual usage from one large branch from the Greater Helsinki Area. 42% of the number of subscriptions placed in that branch, and 48% of the total subscription volume, were proxy subscriptions. The proxy issuers had an average age of 30 years, i.e. they were five years younger than the average subscriber in the sample. The relatively young age of the proxy issuers is probably due to the fact that many of them were apparently underaged children of the receivers of the proxy. Moreover, the financial press has reported of investors who collected large numbers of proxies from high school students in some hot offers.<sup>4</sup>

The shareownership patterns of males and females differ from each other. 54.1% of the individual investors are males and 45.9% of them are females. Shareownership wealth is more skewed towards males than the fraction of the number of investors: males own 65.4% and females 34.6% of individuals' combined investment wealth. Males' ownership fraction has increased somewhat from the beginning of 1997 when it was 63.0%. Relating our results to population data suggests that 15.7% of Finnish males and 12.7% of females – 14.2% of the population – own shares directly.

The gender distribution for IPO investors differs markedly from that for the general investor population. The fraction of males among IPO investors is 66.0%, i.e. 12 percentage points more than among investors at large. In the older IPO sample, the fraction of males is lower, 63.3%. At least part of the difference between the fractions of male investors may be explained by the different impact of proxy subscriptions. Keloharju's (2000) data suggests that the majority of the proxy issuers, 54%, were females whereas the overwhelming majority of the receivers of the proxies, 76%, were males. In other words, the fraction of female investors in the 1980s may have been artificially inflated by the fact that many of them were simply issuing proxies to male investors who were the actual end investors.

Table 3 also reports the fraction of investors with at least one million FIM worth of shares (henceforth, millionaires) by age and sex. As expected from the investment wealth figures, males are more dominant among millionaires than among investors at large. Men account for 62.9% for the millionaires, which is almost nine percentage points more than their fraction of all investors. Moreover, millionaires also tend to be more senior people than investors in general. Millionaire males are on average 57.8 years, i.e. ten years older than investors at large. Millionaire females are on average 60.9 years old.




FIGURE 1. Investors and population by age and sex. Investor data are from June 1, 2000 and population data from January 1, 2000.

Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of inhabitants and investors in each age and sex category. Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of inhabitants and IPO investors in each age and sex category. Figure 3 compares the proportion of inhabitants in each age and sex category to the proportion of investment wealth owned by the investors in this category.

Figure 4 displays individual investors' mean wealth as a function of their birth year. Older investors are on average wealthier than younger investors: for example, the mean wealth for investors who were born in 1970 is 116,400 FIM whereas that for investors born in 1940 is 248,400 FIM. It is interesting to note that the mean wealth is approximately a linear function of investor age whereas the median wealth (without HPY Holding), as shown by Figure 5, is not<sup>5</sup>: the median investment wealth for investors who were born before 1942 actually tends to be lower the older the investor is whereas for investors born after 1942 age is generally positively related to investment wealth.

<sup>5</sup> If HPY Holding is considered, the median investment is the same for most birth year cohorts. As discussed before, this is due to the fact that many investors own exactly 150 shares of HPY Holding, an outcome of their former holding of one share of HPY.





FIGURE 2. IPO investors and population by age and sex. Investor data are from 1995–2000 and population data from January 1, 2000. The age of IPO investors is taken at the time of the first subscription.



Proportion of investment wealth or population in each age and sex category

FIGURE 3. Investment wealth and population by age and sex. Investment wealth data are from June 1, 2000 and population data from January 1, 2000.




FIGURE 4. Investors' mean investment wealth as a function of birth year at June 1, 2000.




FIGURE 5. Median investor's investment wealth as a function of birth year at June 1, 2000 (HPY Holding excluded).

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# 3.3. Investment activity and wealth by zip code, province, and country of residence

Table 4 shows how investment wealth in Finland is distributed across provinces. There are substantial differences in investment wealth per inhabitant as well as in the relative frequency of investor-inhabitants. In particular, the provinces of Ahvenanmaa and Uusimaa stand out: the ratio of investor-inhabitants to all inhabitants is in Ahvenanmaa 33.5% and in Uusimaa 26.6% whereas the national average is 14.3%. The ratio of investor-inhabitants in Uusimaa is largely driven by the Greater Helsinki Area in which 29.8% of the inhabitants own stocks. The next-largest investment activity is in Pirkanmaa where 17.5% of the inhabitants own stocks. The average investment wealth per inhabitant is in Ahvenanmaa 112,900 FIM and in Uusimaa 75,100 FIM (in Greater Helsinki Area 93,600 FIM) whereas the national average is 31,400 FIM.

The distribution of aggregate investment wealth by region gives a good idea of where most of the stockownership wealth resides. Since the Greater Helsinki Area has much more inhabitants than Ahvenanmaa, the Greater Helsinki Area accounts for the majority, 54.6%, of shareownership wealth while Ahvananmaa accounts only for 1.8% of shareownership wealth. Pirkanmaa and Varsinais-Suomi represent the second- and third-most important concentrations of shareownership wealth with 7.0% and 6.1% of aggregate shareownership wealth, respectively. Although not reported here formally, the geographic distribution of millionaires largely resembles the geographic distribution of aggregate investment wealth.

Table 4 also shows the distribution of the number of IPO investors and the number of investors at large by province. As expected, Uusimaa and the Greater Helsinki Area dominate the number of investor statistics, although less clearly than the aggregate wealth statistics. Somewhat surprisingly, however, IPO investment is less concentrated to the Greater Helsinki Area than investment at large. The Greater Helsinki Area accounts for 38.2% of all investors, whereas it accounted for 33.4% of IPO investors in 1995-2000 and 29.9% of IPO investors in 1987-1994. This below-normal IPO investment activity in the Greater Helsinki Area may simply be a consequence of an above-normal IPO investment activity in the rest of Finland, which again may be driven by the provinces where the IPO companies are headquartered. For example, the large IPO investment activity in Pohjois-Savo in the period 1987-94 is probably largely due to the success of the IPO of Olvi, a company based in Iisalmi in Pohjois-Savo. This may be because of the so-called distance effect or home bias, i.e. that investors are more likely to invest in companies located nearby (section 3.5. of the paper will demonstrate that the distance effect figures importantly for investors residing outside of the Greater Helsinki Region). This effect is further strengthened by the fact that employees – who tend to live close to the headquarters of the company - are often issued shares at a discount and they tend to be awarded relatively larger allocations of shares in the event the IPO is oversubscribed.

TABLE 4. Investment activity and wealth by province and form of municipality at June 1, 2000. The number of inhabitants refers to their number at January 1, 2000.

				Median						
		Number of	Investors'	individual	Individuals'	Sum of	Proportion	Proportion		
		individual	mean	investor's	investment	individuals'	of individuals'	of total	Proportion of total	of total
	Number of	investors /	investment	investment	wealth per	investment	total	number of	number of individual	dividual
Province or	individual	Number of	wealth,	wealth,	inhabitant,	wealth,	investment	individual	IPO investors	stors
form of municipality	investors	inhabitants	1000 FIM	1000 FIM	1000 FIM	mill. FIM	wealth	investors	1987-1994	1995-2000
Province:										
Uusimaa	343 605	26.6 %	282.2	31.2	75.1	696 96	29.8 %	46.6 %	34.7 %	39.9 %
of which in Greater Helsinki Area*	281 746	29.8 %	314.1	31.2	93.6	88 504	54.6 %	38.2 %	29.9 %	33.4 %
Itä-Uusimaa	11 162	12.5 %	298.5	31.2	37.4	3 332	2.1 %	1.5 %	% 8.0	1.7 %
Varsinais-Suomi	47 991	10.8 %	206.8	24.5	22.3	9 924	6.1 %	6.5 %	9.5 %	8.7 %
Satakunta	22 654	9.5 %	136.6	19.6	12.9	3 095	1.9 %	3.1 %	3.0 %	4.0 %
Kanta-Häme	14 014	8.5 %	161.6	20.4	13.7	2 264	1.4 %	1.9 %	2.0 %	2.1 %
Pirkanmaa	78 029	17.5 %	145.2	10.5	25.3	11 329	7.0 %	10.6 %	% 6.9	7.9 %
Päijät-Häme	16 723	8.5 %	171.5	20.1	14.5	2 868	1.8 %	2.3 %	2.3 %	2.6 %
Kymenlaakso	15 099	8.0%	141.4	21.5	11.3	2 135	1.3 %	2.0 %	2.2 %	2.2 %
Etelä-Karjala	11 722	8.5 %	149.2	20.4	12.7	1 749	1.1%	1.6 %	1.5 %	1.8 %
Etelä-Savo	12 708	7.5 %	138.1	20.1	10.4	1 755	1.1%	1.7 %	1.5 %	2.1 %
Pohjois-Savo	18 113	7.1 %	148.6	17.4	10.6	2 692	1.7 %	2.5 %	2.8 %	3.1 %
Pohjois-Karjala	10 652	6.2 %	165.4	20.0	10.2	1 761	1.1%	1.4 %	1.9 %	1.8 %
Keski-Suomi	27 180	10.4 %	109.6	17.0	11.4	2 980	1.8 %	3.7 %	3.1%	3.4 %
Etelä-Pohjanmaa	21 055	10.7 %	115.3	14.7	12.3	2 428	1.5 %	2.9 %	6.2 %	3.4 %
Pohjanmaa	20 672	11.9 %	193.5	20.0	23.0	4 000	2.5 %	2.8 %	2.9 %	4.1%
Keski-Pohjanmaa	6 038	8.4 %	111.4	20.5	9.4	672	0.4 %	0.8 %	1.2 %	1.1%
Pohjois-Pohjanmaa	24 331	% 2'9	176.0	19.8	11.8	4 283	2.6 %	3.3 %	% 6.9	4.8 %
Kainuu	5 502	% 0.9	157.5	21.2	9.5	867	0.5 %	0.7 %	1.2 %	% 6:0
Lappi	13 947	7.2 %	123.0	20.7	8.8	1 716	1.1 %	1.9 %	2.2 %	2.4 %
Ahvenanmaa	8 624	33.5 %	336.6	24.8	112.9	2 903	1.8 %	1.2 %	1.3 %	1.0 %
Unknown	7 225					2 513	1.5 %	1.0 %	3.3 %	1.2 %
Whole country	737 046	14.3 %	220.1	31.2	31.4	162 233	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %
Form of municipality:										
Urban munipality	556 836	16.3 %	246.3	31.2	40.1	137 143	84.5 %	75.5 %	76.5 %	76.5 %
Rural municipality	170 897	% 6.6		22.7	13.9	23 990	14.8 %	23.2 %	.,	22.2 %
Unknown	9 313		118.2			1 101	% 2.0	1.3 %	3.3 %	1.2 %

<sup>\*</sup> Includes Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa, and Kauniainen.

Figure 6 gives a more accurate description of the geographical distribution of shareownership by illustrating the number of investors per inhabitant figure at the zip code level. The graph shows clear concentration in investment activity in the Greater Helsinki Area, Ahvenanmaa, Pirkanmaa, Pohjanmaa, and Varsinais-Suomi. Figure 7 shows the distribution of investment wealth per inhabitant at the zip code level. Overall, there appears to be much less structure in the distribution of investment wealth per inhabitant than in the number of investors per inhabitant.<sup>6</sup>

Table 5 examines trends in ownership patterns by province. The Greater Helsinki Area has tended to increase its share of shareownership wealth over time (from a 45.9% in January 1995 to 54.6% in June 2000), although roughly one-quarter of this effect is due to the listing of HPY Holding in 1999 in which year Greater Helsinki's ownership fraction increased by 6.1% percentage points. Pirkanmaa experienced an analogous jump in shareownership wealth in 1998 when Tampereen Puhelin, a Pirkanmaa-based company, was listed. The rise and fall of Raisio's share price probably largely explains the changes in Varsinais-Suomi's fraction of investment wealth. Somewhat surprisingly, Pohjois-Pohjanmaa – which includes the Oulu region that performed economically very well in the late 1990s – does not seem to show any clear trend in shareownership wealth fraction.

Table 6 shows the distribution of the number of investors and investment wealth by country of residence. As explained, nominee registered investors – which account for about 99% of all foreign shareholdings – are not included in the analysis because they cannot be separated from each other. By far the largest number of foreign investors are Swedish individuals and institutions, followed by the residents of the U.S., Germany, and the U.K.

The median investments into Finnish stocks by individuals residing abroad are generally in the order of 27,000 FIM – 65,000 FIM, i.e. of the same order or larger than those of the entire investor pool (31,200 FIM). The countries with the largest proportions of aggregate foreign investment wealth are, somewhat unexpectedly, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, and France.

# 3.4. Investment wealth and mother tongue

Table 7 investigates how mother tongue is related to investment wealth. The Swedish-speaking minority (5.7% of the Finnish population) is much wealthier than the Finnish-speaking majority (92.5% of population): the average investment wealth of Finnish-speaking Finns owning stocks, 191,500 FIM, is less than one-third of the investment wealth of Swedish-speaking Finns owning stocks, 602,100 FIM. The ratio of investor-inhabitants to all inhabitants is also greater




FIGURE 6. Number of investors per inhabitant by zip code.




FIGURE 7. Investment wealth per inhabitant by zip code.

TABLE 5. Changes in investment wealth by province.

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				ncluding all	stocks			,	and Tampereen Puhelin	een Puhelii	
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	June 2000	1998	1999	2000	June 2000
Uusimaa	20.9 %	51.5 %	20.6 %	50.4 %	51.9 %	59.2 %	59.8 %	20.0 %	51.7 %	26.6 %	57.7 %
of which in Greater Helsinki Area*	45.9 %	46.7 %	45.7 %	45.3 %	46.7 %	52.8 %	54.6 %	44.9 %	46.6 %	20.9 %	53.1 %
Itä-Uusimaa	2.2	2.2 %	2.5 %	2.9 %	3.2 %	2.1%	2.1%	3.0 %	3.2 %	2.1%	2.1%
Varsinais-Suomi	8.6		% 8.6	10.3 %	8.8%	6.3 %	6.1%	10.4 %	% 0.6	8.9	6.5 %
Satakunta	2.8 %	2.7 %	2.8 %	2.7 %	2.4 %	1.9 %	1.9 %	2.8 %	2.5 %	2.1%	2.0%
Kanta-Häme		1.6 %	1.6 %	1.6 %	1.5 %	1.4 %	1.4 %	1.6 %	1.6 %	1.5 %	1.5 %
Pirkanmaa	7.0 %	% 8.9		6.2 %	7.9 %	% 0.7	7.0 %	6.2 %	% 6.9	7.1%	7.1%
Päijät-Häme	2.4 %	2.4 %	2.5 %	2.6 %	2.2 %	1.8%	1.8 %	2.6 %	2.2 %	1.9 %	1.9 %
Kymenlaakso	1.9 %	1.8 %	1.7 %	1.7 %	1.6%	1.3 %	1.3 %	1.7 %	1.6 %	1.4 %	1.4 %
Etelä-Karjala	1.6 %	1.5 %	1.5 %	1.4 %	1.3 %	1.1%	1.1%	1.4 %	1.4 %	1.2 %	1.1%
Etelä-Savo	1.4 %	1.3 %	1.2 %	1.2 %	1.2 %	1.1%	1.1%	1.2 %	1.3 %	1.2 %	1.1%
Pohjois-Savo	2.0 %	2.4 %	2.4 %	2.4 %	2.5 %	1.7 %	1.7 %	2.4 %	2.3 %	1.8 %	1.8 %
Pohjois-Karjala	1.5 %	1.4 %	1.4 %	1.5 %	1.6%	1.1%	1.1%	1.5 %	1.6 %	1.2 %	1.2 %
Keski-Suomi	2.2 %	2.1%	2.0%	1.9 %	1.9 %	2.0%	1.8 %	1.9 %	1.9 %	2.5 %	1.9 %
Etelä-Pohjanmaa	2.0 %	2.1%	2.1%	2.2 %	1.9%	1.5 %	1.5 %	2.2 %	1.9 %		
Pohjanmaa	2.9 %	2.9 %	2.9 %	2.8 %	2.8 %	2.5 %	2.5 %	2.8 %	2.9 %	2.7 %	
Keski-Pohjanmaa	% 6:0	% 8.0		% 9.0	0.5 %	0.4 %	0.4 %	% 9.0	0.5 %	0.5 %	
Pohjois-Pohjanmaa	2.6 %	2.4 %			2.6 %	5.6 %	2.6 %	2.4 %	2.7 %	2.8 %	2.8 %
Kainuu	0.7 %	0.7 %	0.5 %	% 9.0	% 9.0	0.5 %	0.5 %	% 9.0	% 9.0	% 9.0	% 9.0
Lappi	1.5 %	1.4 %			1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	1.3 %	1.2 %	1.1%	1.1%
Ahvenanmaa	1.3 %	1.8 %	1.8 %	1.8 %	1.7 %	1.9 %	1.8 %	1.8 %	1.7 %	2.1%	1.9 %
Unknown	2.0 %	1.9 %	1.7 %	1.7 %	1.0 %	1.4 %	1.5 %	1.7 %	1.0 %	1.6 %	1.7 %
Totals	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %

TABLE 6. Investment wealth by country of residence at June 1, 2000. Privately registered ownership only.

					Median		Proportion of
					individual		total privately
		Number of in	vestors		investor's	Sum of	registered
			Institutional		investment	investment	foreign
Country of			status		wealth,	wealth,	investment
residence	Individuals	Institutions	unknown	Total	1000 FIM	mill. FIM	wealth
Sweden	1 926	17	3 251	5 194	26.8	4 377	22.5 %
United States	954	3	730	1 687	62.4	1 229	6.3 %
Germany	201	2	903	1 106	64.7	1 012	5.2 %
Great Britain	174	3	657	834	49.2	1 094	5.6 %
Norway	344		246	590	31.2	721	3.7 %
Belgium	34	5	421	460	45.9	456	2.3 %
France	167	1	289	457	18.7	2 151	11.0 %
Switzerland	91		316	407	76.3	1 652	8.5 %
Netherlands	221	2	178	401	36.9	292	1.5 %
Spain	59		261	320	39.3	2 248	11.5 %
Denmark	75		179	254	36.4	2 553	13.1 %
Luxemburg	98	1	86	185	37.5	53	0.3 %
Singapore	96		86	182	131.6	39	0.2 %
Italia	27		136	163	46.8	91	0.5 %
Austria	20		89	109	140.0	433	2.2 %
Canada	30		77	107	138.2	53	0.3 %
China	14		68	82	894.4	54	0.3 %
Japan	11		69	80	289.2	385	2.0 %
Estonia	18	1	60	79	51.0	79	0.4 %
Thailand	40		38	78	31.2	65.4	0.3 %
Poland	37		33	70	124.8	14	0.1 %
Malaysia	35		30	65	33.3	28.6	0.1 %
Australia	10		52	62	69.4	9	0.0 %
Hungary	5		41	46	31.2	43	0.2 %
Ireland	7		31	38	774.1	11	0.1 %
Other or unknown	613	1	518	1 132		340	1.7 %
Totals	5 307	36	8 845	14 188		19 484	100.0 %

TABLE 7. Investment wealth by mother tongue at June 1, 2000. The number of inhabitants refers to their number at January 1, 2000.

			Investors'			Proportion
		Number of investors /	mean investment	Investment wealth per	Sum of investment	of individuals' total
	Number of	Number of	wealth,	inhabitant,	wealth,	investment
Mother tongue	investors	inhabitants	1000 FIM	1000 FIM	mill. FIM	wealth
Finnish	556 067	11.6 %	191.5	22.3	106 478	65.6 %
Swedish	46 004	15.7 %	602.1	94.7	27 697	17.1 %
Other	340		157.2		17	0.0 %
Unknown	130 432		215.0		28 041	17.3 %

for Swedish-speaking Finns (15.7%) than for Finnish-speaking Finns (11.6%). Therefore, the value of the stock portfolio of an average Swedish-speaking Finn is more than four times as large as that of an average Finnish-speaking Finn.

# 3.5. The influence of headquarters location on shareownership

Recent research has documented that investors tend to prefer to invest in stocks that are head-quartered close to the municipality where the investor lives.<sup>7</sup> This so called home bias or distance effect may arise, among other reasons, because investors are more familiar with these companies, because they have superior information of these companies, or because they have invested in these companies due to an employee or customer relationship.

Table 8 provides a simple analysis of the preference of investors to invest in companies that are headquartered in the same municipality or province the investor lives in. Following Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000c), we compute the following ratio to measure this preference:

Firm i's shareowner weight for investors in the municipality of its headquarters

Firm i's shareowner weight among all investors in Finland

The numerator is simply the number of individual shareowners of firm *i* residing in the municipality the firm is headquartered in, divided by the sum, across all firms, of the number of shareowners residing in that same municipality. The denominator is the comparable ratio for all of Finland. As an example, take the real estate investment company Technopolis, which has 1998 individual shareowners, 357 of whom live in its headquarters city of Oulu. Summing the number of individual shareowners over all firms, we find that Oulu has 28,088 individual shareowners, while Finland has 1,738,412 shareowners. The numerator for Technopolis' ratio is thus 357 / 28,088 while the denominator is 1998 / 1,738,412, making Technopolis' ratio 11.06.

The results suggest that individual investors living in the headquarters municipality (province) of a median company are 12.14 (6.82) times more likely to own the stock of that company than the stock of other companies, provided that the company is headquartered outside of the Greater Helsinki Area. For 60 of these 61 companies, an investor living in the headquarters municipality of the company is more likely to invest in that company than in other companies. The preference for institutions to invest in companies headquartered nearby is some-

<sup>7</sup> Huberman (1998) observes that Regional Bell Operating Companies are more likely to be held by investors who subscribe to their local telephone service. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) document that mutual funds prefer to invest in locally headquartered companies. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000c) find that, controlling for language and cultural factors, distance figures importantly in the shareownership and trading patterns of both household and institutional investors.

TABLE 8. The influence of headquarters location on shareownership.

All ownership figures are from June 1, 2000.

	Summary statisti	cs for the ratio M	Summary statistics for the ratio Numerator/Denominator	tor		
	Numerator = Firr	n /ˈs weight amoı	ng investors in its he	Numerator = Firm /'s weight among investors in its headquarters municipality or province	ality or province	
	Denominator = F	irm <i>i</i> 's weight an	Denominator = Firm i's weight among all investors in Finland	Finland		
	Investor in same	nvestor in same municipality as headquarters	eadquarters	Investor in sam	Investor in same province as headquarters	adquarters
			Investor category	tegory		
	SplouesnoH	Institutions	All investors	Households	Institutions	All investors
Median for firms of the following type:						
Helsinki area headquartered companies (N=110)	1.04	1.09	1.07	0.98	1.03	1.00
Rest of the Finland headquartered companies (N=61)	12.14	7.28	12.15	6.82	4.10	6.70
All companies (N=171)	1.28	1.23	1.28	1.12	1.13	1.15
Fraction greater than 1 for firms of following type:						
Helsinki area headquartered companies	0.55	09:0	0.54	0.47	0.55	0.50
Rest of the Finland headquartered companies	0.98	0.85	96.0	0.93	0.87	0.93
All companies	0.70	0.69	0.70	0.64	99.0	0.65

what smaller, although still very notable. However, Greater Helsinki Area headquartered companies display much less distance effect than other companies. This is probably largely due to the fact that these companies tend to be larger and more nationally known, attracting investors from all over Finland.

### 3.6. Concentration of individuals' investment wealth

Table 9 shows the degree of concentration in individuals' shareownership. In June 1, 2000, the richest 0.5% of individual *investors* owned 50.7% and the richest 1% 59.4% of the investment wealth of individuals. Similarly, the richest 0.5% of the entire Finnish *population* owned 71.6% and the richest 1% 79.1% of the investment wealth of individuals. It is useful to put these figures into perspective by comparing them to U.S. figures. For example, the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, reported in Poterba (2000), finds that the richest 0.5% of the U.S. households owned 41.4% and the richest 1% 53.2% of the share ownership wealth of individuals in the U.S. In other words, shareowner wealth appears to be much more concentrated in Finland than in the U.S. although, for instance, income is much more concentrated in the U.S. than in Finland. Figure 8 illustrates the concentration of ownership in Finland and in the U.S. by a Lorenz curve.

What accounts for this puzzling result? To begin with, the result is *not* due to the overall level of participation in the stock market through direct shareholdings. According to 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances, 27.4 million Americans – 10.4% of the population – held stocks directly in 1995, whereas the analogous figure in Finland in June 2000 was 14.2%.<sup>8</sup> In other words, direct equity ownership is relatively more common in Finland than in the U.S. (although indirect ownership e.g. through mutual funds is much less common in Finland).

The difference in the method of sampling is probably a much more important determinant of the result. The Finnish results are based on ownership by individual investors, whereas in the U.S. all the ownership concentration results are from the household level, i.e. individual investor data are pooled to a family level. Since household level data pool wealth from several (at least one, and often two or more) individuals, ownership at the household level will generally display less variation than ownership at the individual level. This means that we should expect to find less concentration of ownership at the household level than at the individual level. Unfortunately we do not know how much the unit of analysis – household vs.

**<sup>8</sup>** New York Stock Exchange's Shareownership 1998. Between 1992 and 1995, the number of U.S. investors with direct shareholdings actually decreased from 29.2 to 27.4 million. If the trend has continued, the fraction of the population with direct shareholdings should be less today.

**<sup>9</sup>** We have no data on family relationships, which makes it impossible to aggregate our results to the household level to make them comparable to the U.S. figures.

TABLE 9. Proportion of individuals' total investment wealth owned by the richest n% of individual investors and by the richest n% of population.

All Finnish ownership figures are from January 1 except that "June 2000" refers to June 1, 2000. Gini coefficients are for investors only except that the two rightmost Gini coefficients are computed based on the entire population. The data on U.S. ownership are from 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, reported in Poterba (2000).

	·							Cumulative	Cumulative
								proportion	proportion
									owned by the
								richest n% of	richest n% of
								individuals	households
								of the	of all
								Finnish	U.S.
	Cum	ulative pro	portion ov	wned by th	e richest n	% of inves	tors	population,	households,
Percentile	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	June 2000	June 2000	1998
0.1	19.1 %	21.3 %	22.3 %	24.8 %	25.1 %	30.5 %	32.6 %	52.1 %	N.A.
0.5	34.4 %	36.7 %	37.6 %	39.9 %	41.8 %	47.9 %	50.7 %	71.6 %	41.4 %
1	42.9 %	45.4 %	46.2 %	48.3 %	51.0 %	56.6 %	59.4 %	79.1 %	53.2 %
2	52.7 %	55.1 %	55.9 %	57.6 %	60.7 %	65.1 %	67.8 %	86.1 %	N.A.
3	52.7 %	61.3 %	62.1 %	63.5 %	66.6 %	70.0 %	72.4 %	89.7 %	N.A.
4	59.0 %	65.9 %	66.7 %	67.8 %	70.7 %	73.3 %	75.6 %	91.9 %	N.A.
5	63.7 %	69.6 %	70.3 %	71.2 %	73.8 %	75.9 %	77.9 %	93.5 %	80.9 %
6	67.4 %	72.6 %	73.2 %	73.9 %	76.4 %	78.0 %	79.8 %	94.6 %	N.A.
7	73.1 %	75.1 %	75.7 %	76.2 %	78.4 %	79.9 %	81.4 %	95.5 %	N.A.
8	75.3 %	77.2 %	77.8 %	78.2 %	80.2 %	81.4 %	82.8 %	96.3 %	N.A.
9	77.2 %	79.1 %	79.6 %	79.9 %	81.7 %	82.8 %	84.0 %	97.1 %	N.A.
10	78.9 %	80.7 %	81.2 %	81.4 %	83.0 %	83.9 %	85.0 %	97.9 %	91.2 %
20	89.1 %	90.3 %	90.7 %	90.5 %	90.8 %	90.5 %	91.1 %	100.0 %	98.4 %
30	93.8 %	94.6 %	94.9 %	94.7 %	94.4 %	93.5 %	94.0 %	100.0 %	N.A.
40	96.4 %	97.0 %	97.1 %	97.0 %	96.5 %	95.3 %	95.7 %	100.0 %	N.A.
50	98.0 %	98.3 %	98.4 %	98.3 %	97.8 %	96.9 %	97.1 %	100.0 %	N.A.
60	98.9 %	99.1 %	99.2 %	99.1 %	98.8 %	98.4 %	98.5 %	100.0 %	N.A.
70	99.5 %	99.6 %	99.6 %	99.6 %	99.4 %	99.3 %	99.3 %	100.0 %	N.A.
80	99.8 %	99.8 %	99.9 %	99.8 %	99.8 %	99.7 %	99.7 %	100.0 %	N.A.
90	99.95 %	99.96 %	99.97 %	99.95 %	99.95 %	99.95 %	99.95 %	100.0 %	N.A.
Gini coefficient	0.859	0.870	0.874	0.874	0.878	0.876	0.884	0.983	0.96
			Ownershi	ip at perce	ntile, 1000	FIM			
Percentile	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	June 2000		
0.1	4 446.0	4 160.9	6 229.3	7 903.5	10 014.1	19 465.7	21 406.4		
0.5	1 329.4	1 255.8	1 814.6	2 270.1	2 942.1	5 <b>18</b> 5.3	5 556.9		
1	778.7	722.4	1 061.2	1 294.6	1 611.1	2 630.6	2 769.3		
2	440.3	401.9	590.9	718.4	847.2	1 285.1	1 296.4		
3	313.3	285.1	415.7	501.5	567.9	840.0	820.5		
4	242.9	220.0	320.1	382.4	420.7	619.1	594.8		
5	197.7	177.2	258.4	306.5	330.2	491.5	466.2		
6	164.9	147.1	214.0	253.7	268.0	412.5	383.9		
7	139.9	125.0	181.3	215.2	224.1	361.8	325.2		
8	121.5	108.1	156.5	186.7	191.5	305.3	284.1		
9	106.3	94.1	136.6	162.9	166.4	263.2	245.9		
10	93.8	83.0	120.3	144.3	146.6	230.4	215.9		
20	37.9	32.7	47.0	58.5	58.8	85.6	84.7		
30	19.9	16.9	23.8	30.4	31.0	48.0	48.5		
40	11.6	9.6	13.5	17.3	18.8	33.2	31.5		
50	7.1	5.6	7.8	10.1	13.2	33.2	31.2		
60	4.2	3.3	4.6	6.2	9.9	25.7	25.4		
70	2.4	1.8	2.4	3.6	5.6	11.6	12.5		
80	1.3	1.0	1.3	1.9	3.0	7.1	7.5		
90	0.6	0.4	0.5	1.1	1.3	2.5	2.5	_	




FIGURE 8. Distribution of individuals' investment wealth. The Finnish shareownership data are from the individual investor level and from June 1, 2000. The U.S. ownership data are from the household level and from 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances.

individual – affects our results, but its effect should be very large to turn around the result that shareownership in Finland is more concentrated than shareownership in the U.S.

Table 9 also shows how the concentration of ownership has evolved over time. A useful summary measure of ownership concentration is the Gini coefficient, which is defined as two times the area between the straight line and the Lorenz curve. By definition, the Gini coefficient varies between 0 and 1, with larger numbers indicating larger degrees of concentration.<sup>10</sup>

Our results show that the shareownership concentration by Finnish individuals has increased almost monotonically during the sample period. The Gini coefficients, computed from ownership among investors, increased from 0.859 in 1995 to 0.884 in June 1, 2000. The Gini coefficients based on the entire population are naturally much larger. At the end of the sample

**<sup>10</sup>** Following Deltas (2000), the Gini coefficient is estimated as  $2\cos(y,r_y)/(nE(y))$ , where n is the number of individuals sampled and  $\cos(y,r_y)$  is the covariance between shareownership wealth, y, and the ranks of individuals according to their shareownership wealth,  $r_y$ , from the poorest  $(r_y = 1)$  to the richest  $(r_y = n)$ . The U.S. Gini coefficient for 1998 is estimated assuming a piecewise linear Lorenz curve.

period, the Gini coefficient for Finnish individuals was 0.983, whereas the Gini coefficient for U.S. households in 1998 was approximately 0.96.

There are at least two potential reasons for the increase in ownership concentration in Finland. First, mutual funds have become much more popular than what they were at the beginning of the sample period. For example, on June 1, 2000 the total number of owners in equity-linked mutual funds investing mostly in Finland was 155,000, whereas the corresponding number was only 45,000 in January 1997.<sup>11</sup> Given the fixed costs involved with small direct shareholdings, it is understandable that particularly small investors have sold their direct shareholdings and become customers of mutual funds. Second, the recent success stories in many Finnish information technology companies have generated significant amounts of shareownership wealth. In many cases, and particularly in newly listed companies, this shareownership wealth has been concentrated in the portfolios of a relatively small number of shareowners.

## 3.7. Wealthy investors

Table 10 presents the number of investors with different portfolio sizes and how the number of wealthy investors has evolved over time. The table indicates that on June 1, 2000 there were 18,398 investors with at least one million FIM of shareownership wealth (henceforth, millionaires) and 4006 investors with at least 5 million FIM worth of shares (henceforth, 5-millionaires). Nokia is an important component in many millionaires' portfolios. Excluding ownership in Nokia would reduce the number of millionaires to about one-half, 9530. Excluding ownership in Sonera would reduce the number of millionaires only modestly, to 17,478.

Table 10 indicates that between January 1, 1995 and June 1, 2000, the number of millionaires increased by 450% and the number of 5-millionaires increased by 900%. Of course, the increase is largely due to the overall bull market during the same period. To assess how a change in the overall market level would change the number of millionaires, we computed the number of millionaires as of June 1, 2000 assuming that the general index would change by  $\pm 40\%$  or less and that all stocks would experience exactly the same relative price change. Regressing the logarithm of the change in the number of millionaires against the logarithm of the change in the index gives us a "millionaire elasticity" of 0.89. This means that a 1% increase in the general index level would be expected to increase the number of millionaires by 0.89%. Similarly, we estimate that a 1% increase in the general index level would be expected to increase the number of 5-millionaires by 1.05%. In other words, a stock price change of the

TABLE 10. Number of individual investors by size of portfolio.

All ownership figures are from January 1 except that "June 2000" refers to June 1, 2000.

Portfolio value, mill. FIM	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	June 2000
0.1	45 175	41 419	55 449	70 813	78 487	133 759	132 628
0.2	23 511	21 393	30 538	39 316	44 781	83 039	79 553
0.3	14 955	13 635	20 406	26 740	31 553	60 305	56 610
0.4	10 652	9 707	14 932	19 908	24 272	46 105	43 115
0.5	8 123	7 486	11 571	15 739	19 763	36 538	35 087
1	3 349	3 105	4 978	6 990	9 534	18 383	18 398
2	1 362	1 269	2 035	2 959	4 426	9 495	9 818
3	826	750	1 197	1 772	2 725	6 345	6 705
4	554	505	842	1 231	1 942	4 696	5 017
5	398	369	636	920	1 438	3 743	4 006
10	142	152	244	373	564	1 710	1 864
20	51	54	91	161	242	697	784
30	24	35	56	102	150	401	480
40	10	16	36	69	89	279	316
50	9	10	28	48	60	209	239
100	2	1	7	18	23	84	90

same magnitude is expected to change the number of wealthy investors relatively more than the number of less wealthy investors. An investigation of the relative changes in the number of investors at different wealth levels confirms that this result seems to hold also more generally.

### 3.8. Portfolio diversification

Table 11 describes the diversification of stock portfolios. Most individual investors hold poorly diversified portfolios: 56.2% of individual investors have only one stock in their portfolio and 18.2% hold two stocks. This result is not driven by the more than 250,000 shareholders of HPY Holding: if we exclude HPY Holding from the analysis, the proportion of single-stock portfolios decreases only to 54.3%. Also institutions hold poorly diversidfied portfolios: 55.7% of them hold only one stock and 17.7% two stocks. The average number of stocks held is 2.4 for individuals and 2.9 for institutions. Household portfolios have thus become somewhat more diversified after 1997 when the average investor's portfolio had only 2.0 stocks. A likely explanation for this pattern is that during the recent years many small shareholders have sold their direct shareholdings, perhaps to improve diversification by investing the proceeds in mutual funds.

Because of, among others, the fixed costs in each securities transaction, large portfolios tend to be better diversified than small portfolios. On average, household investors with at least one million FIM worth of shares hold 9.3 stocks. However, even many relatively large investors hold ill-diversified portfolios. For example, 5.5% of the millionaires hold only one

TABLE 11. Patterns in portfolio diversification at June 1, 2000.

Number of		Portfolio va	alue, 1000 FIN	1		
stocks in	Individ	duals	Institu	tions	Proportion of	investors
portfolio	Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Individuals	Institutions
1	42.6	17.8	490.4	31.2	56.2 %	55.7 %
2	107.3	35.7	3 947.4	86.5	18.2 %	17.7 %
3	208.9	57.0	2 869.3	152.0	8.7 %	7.5 %
4	288.7	87.2	15 167.8	219.6	5.1 %	4.4 %
5	473.5	126.0	6 415.4	281.2	3.3 %	3.0 %
6	606.6	168.9	10 005.9	404.8	2.2 %	2.2 %
7	1 196.7	226.7	7 493.5	506.7	1.6 %	1.6 %
8	996.1	283.5	5 778.1	643.6	1.1 %	1.3 %
9	1 310.2	344.1	9 858.6	779.4	0.8 %	1.1 %
10	2 049.6	419.4	18 407.1	926.1	0.6 %	0.8 %
>10	3 053.6	754.8	14 296.4	3616.4	2.1 %	4.8 %

Panel B. Portfolio diversification by institutional status, line of business, or profession

	Median	
	investors'	Mean
	investment	number of
	wealth,	stocks in
Investor type	1000 FIM	portfolio
Categorization by institutional status:		
Institutions	62.4	2.93
Males	31.2	2.64
Females	31.2	2.00
Individuals total	31.2	2.35
Privately registered foreign ownership	31.2	2.28
Institutional status unknown	40.8	2.41
Registered ownership total	31.2	2.37
Categorization by line of business or profession:		
Non-financial corporations	62.4	2.74
Deposit money and other credit corporations	1 086.7	5.59
Insurance corporations	583.8	18.10
Fin. auxiliaries and other fin. intermediaries	125.4	7.15
Financial and insurance institutions total	846.3	8.46
General government	126.4	3.27
Employment pension schemes	72 771.9	31.78
Other social security funds	553.5	4.70
General government total	210.0	7.34
Non-profit institutions	31.2	2.90
Employers and own-account workers	17.5	2.57
Employees	31.2	2.38
Other households	26.3	2.06
Households total	31.2	2.34
Rest of the world	40.8	2.28
Unknown	49.6	3.42

stock, and 6.8% hold two stocks. About two-thirds of the one-stock millionaires have all their shareownership wealth in Nokia.

## 3.9. Ownership structure and firm characteristics

Table 12 takes a brief look into how the ownership structure of publicly quoted share classes is related to their exchange listing, industry, and market capitalization. To analyze the general tendencies behind investment in different share classes, the table gives each share class an equal weight. This obviously significantly downplays the role of large companies like Nokia, which consitute the bulk of the market capitalization. Appendix 1 shows a detailed list of ownership structure variables by share class. All reported differences in investor preferences in Table 12 are significant at least at the 5% level.

TABLE 12. The relationship between a stock's ownership structure and its industry, exchange listing, and market capitalization at June 1, 2000.

			-	Equally		
				weighted		
				average		
				proportion		
		weighted av	3	of individual		
	proportion	of shares o		investors	weighted	Number
			Foreign	who are	average of	of share
	Institutions	Individuals	investors	males	mean age	classes
Stock exchange listing						
Main list	48.4 %	30.7 %	20.3 %	67.0 %	50.8	123
Banks & Finance	50.6 %	40.6 %	8.8 %	59.9 %	48.7	6
Insurance	55.1 %	12.6 %	31.9 %	64.9 %		3
Investment	74.3 %	20.7 %	4.6 %	69.2 %		8
Transport	55.8 %	24.4 %	19.7 %	62.9 %	52.0	6
Trade	60.4 %	15.1 %	24.4 %	55.2 %	54.3	8
Other Services	39.7 %	23.0 %	36.2 %	73.7 %	48.6	6
Metal & Engineering	51.1 %	29.8 %	19.1 %	68.6 %		15
Forest Industry	42.0 %	19.7 %	37.9 %	68.6 %		6
Multi-business	34.6 %		21.3 %	69.0 %		6
Energy	94.4 %		1.9 %	68.5 %		3
Food Industry	43.2 %		18.9 %	73.9 %		11
Construction	36.8 %	57.8 %	5.3 %	73.2 %		3
Telecommunications & Electronics	34.7 %		23.6 %	67.2 %		22
Chemicals	56.0 %		13.7 %	62.6 %		4
Media & Publishing	46.3 %		17.3 %	64.9 %		7
Other Industries	47.0 %	28.9 %	24.1 %	66.8 %	51.2	9
I-list	48.9 %	46.1 %	4.1 %	72.5 %	48.3	37
NM-list	20.7 %	66.4 %	11.9 %	76.3 %	41.0	13
Market capitalization quintile						
1 (Largest)	45.7 %	23.8 %	30.1 %	64.0 %	50.8	34
2	56.4 %	24.9 %	17.6 %	64.3 %	52.2	35
3	40.2 %	39.2 %	20.3 %	70.1 %	47.9	35
4	46.1 %	43.3 %	9.7 %	74.0 %	47.9	35
5 (Smallest)	43.5 %	52.3 %	3.4 %	72.1 %	48.7	34

Like in Japan, foreign investors prefer stocks listed on the main list and those with large market capitalization (see Kang and Stulz (1997)). These are generally also the most liquid stocks. Contrary to domestic institutions, foreign investors are relatively more invested in NM-list companies than in I-list companies. Again, the difference in foreign investors' preference may be explained by the greater liquidity of NM-listed companies. Individual investors tend to invest more in small stocks and those listed on the I-list and NM-list. Similar results have been documented in the U.S. by Sias and Starks (1997).

There are also clear differences in individual investors' preferences. Females invest relatively more in stocks listed on the HSE main list and those with large market capitalization whereas males prefer the more risky small stocks and those listed on the NM-list or I-list. These differences in investment allocation are probably at least partly driven by differences in risk tolerance: Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) find that single women are relatively more risk averse in their asset holdings than single men or married couples. However, the results probably also reflect the fact that the bulk of the initial owners in many newly listed technology companies are males, and that males tend to be relatively more active in intial public offerings, another very risky class of stocks. Particularly in the NM-listed companies, which all have been listed after June 1999, the June 1, 2000 ownership gender structure largely resembles the gender structure immediately after the listing.

Age also influences investment allocation. The average age for the owners of NM-list companies is almost ten years less than that for the main list companies, and more than seven years less than for the I-list companies. This probably reflects the fact that both the initial owners and the IPO investors in NM-list companies tend to be younger than investors at large.

### 4. CONCLUSIONS

This study documents patters in the ownership of Finnish shares on June 1, 2000 and changes in these patterns in since the beginning of 1995. It utilizes a unique database which consists of the shareholdings of approximately half a million individuals and institutions. The data originate from the Finnish Central Securities Depository (FCSD) which keeps track of the registered shareholdings of all Finnish investors having invested in the stocks represented in FCSD. Practically all Finnish companies have joined the register, and it covers more than 99.99% of the total market capitalization of Finnish stocks.

Our main findings are as follows:

• Foreign investors are by far the largest investor category with a 69.9% share of the market capitalization. Foreigners' predominant role is largely due to their almost 90%

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ownership stake in Nokia which accounts for about two-thirds of the market capitalization on the Helsinki Stock Exchange; without Nokia, foreigners would have a 32% ownership stake in Finnish stocks. After foreigners, the largest shareholders in terms of their fraction of total market capitalization are general government (10.1%), households (7.2%), non-financial corporations (4.8%), financial and insurance institutions (2.8%), and non-profit institutions (2.2%).

- The role of foreign ownership has steadily increased over time. Households and, to less extent, non-profit institutions have experienced a surge in ownership fraction after January 1999, whereas the ownership fractions of non-financial corporations, finance and insurance institutions, and the general government have decreased.
- 15.7% of Finnish males and 12.7% of females own shares directly. Males own 63% and females 37% of individuals' combined investment wealth. The median investment wealth for individuals who own shares is 31,200 FIM whereas the mean is more than seven times as large as that, 223,800 FIM.
- Investment wealth tends to be concentrated to the more senior citizens. Male investors are on average ten years and female investors nine years older than the population average. Investors with at least one million FIM worth of investment wealth are on average about ten years older than investors at large.
- There are substantial differences in investment wealth per inhabitant as well as in the relative frequency of investor-inhabitants across provinces. In terms of investment wealth per inhabitant, Ahvenanmaa is the richest and Uusimaa is the second-richest province in Finland. The average investment wealth per inhabitant in Ahvenanmaa is 112,900 FIM and in Uusimaa 75,100 FIM (in Greater Helsinki Area 93,600 FIM) whereas the national average is 31,400 FIM. Similarly, in Ahvenanmaa 33.5% and in the Greater Helsinki Area 29.8% of inhabitants own shares directly. The national average is 14.3%.
- The Greater Helsinki Area accounts for the majority, 54.6%, of shareownership wealth. Pirkanmaa and Varsinais-Suomi represent the second- and third-most important concentrations of shareownership wealth with 7.0% and 6.1% of aggregate shareownership wealth, respectively.
- The Greater Helsinki Area has tended to increase its share of shareownership wealth over time. Somewhat surprisingly, Pohjois-Pohjanmaa which includes the Oulu region that performed economically very well in the late 1990s does not seem to show any clear trend in shareownership wealth fraction.
- In terms of investor numbers, Swedish individuals and institutions are the largest group of non-nominee registered foreign investors in Finland. Residents of the U.S., Ger-

many, and the U.K. are the next-largest groups.

- The Swedish-speaking minority is much wealthier than the Finnish-speaking majority: the average investment wealth of Finnish-speaking Finns owning stocks, 191,500 FIM, is less than one-third of the investment wealth of Swedish-speaking Finns owning stocks, 602,100 FIM. The ratio of investor-inhabitants to all inhabitants is also greater for Swedish-speaking Finns (15.7%) than for Finnish-speaking Finns (11.6%).
- Individual investors living in the headquarters municipality of a median company are 12 times more likely to own the stock of that company than the stock of other companies, provided that the company is headquartered outside of the Greater Helsinki Area. The preference for institutions to invest in companies headquartered nearby is somewhat smaller, although still very notable. Greater Helsinki Area headquartered companies display much less of this distance effect than other companies.
- There are 18,398 investors with at least one million FIM of shareownership wealth and 4006 investors with at least 5 million FIM worth of shares. Excluding ownership in Nokia would reduce the number of millionaires to about one-half, 9530. Excluding ownership in Sonera would reduce the number of millionaires by 5% to 17,478. A 1% increase in the general index level would be expected to increase the number of millionaires by 0.89% and the number of 5-millionaires by 1.05%.
- The richest 0.1% of individual investors owns 32.6% and the richest 1% 59.4% of the total investment wealth of individuals. Individuals' ownership has become more concentrated over time. Although it is not possible to unambigiously compare the concentration of shareownership in Finland to that in the U.S., concentration of shareownership in Finland appears to be large compared with that in the U.S.
- Most investors hold poorly diversified portfolios: only 11.7% of individuals and 14.6% of institutions hold at least five stocks in their portfolio. The average number of stocks held is 2.4 for individuals and 2.9 for institutions. Even many relatively large investors hold ill-diversified portfolios. For example, 5.5% of the millionaires hold only one stock, and 6.8% hold two stocks.
- Foreign investors prefer stocks which have large market capitalization and those listed on the main list. Individual investors prefer stocks with low market capitalization, and those listed in the I-list and NM-list.
- There are also clear differences in individual investors' preferences. Females invest relatively more in stocks listed on the HSE main list and those with large market capitalization whereas males prefer the more risky IPO stocks, small stocks and those listed in the NM- and I-list. The more senior citizens prefer stocks with large market values and younger investors IPOs and smaller companies.

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APPENDIX 1. Descriptive statistics of the ownership of shares listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange at June 1, 2000.

For the definition of distance rati	ınce ratio, see	io, see Table 8.					)				
								Proportion of privately			
	Market	Number of privately	Proportion of shares owned by	shares owr	ned by	Proportion of individual investors who are	of individual ho are	registered investors who		Distance ratio (municipalities)	atio lities)
Share class	value,	registered	Domestic Domestic Domestic	stic	Foreign	Males	Finnish	own less	Mean	House-	Insti-
Main list											
Banks & Finance											
Ålandsbanken A	493		26.0 %	41.3 %	2.4 %	52.5 %	8.3 %	% 0.09	49.2	44.11	29.36
Ålandsbanken B	415		31.8 %	63.6 %	4.6 %	53.8 %	16.6 %	53.3 %	49.1	37.33	20.12
Conventum	3977		% 5.09	37.8 %	1.6 %	70.9 %	76.5 %	8.6	47.1	0.67	1.01
Mandatum Pankki B	1096	2756	51.4 %	48.0 %	% 9.0	74.4 %	74.3 %	4.9 %	47.8	1.06	0.95
Nordic Baltic Holding	24507	225898	29.0 %	38.1 %	34.3 %	20.0 %	75.3 %	61.2 %	49.1		
OKO A	2212	24713	75.1 %	14.9 %	9.1 %	28.0 %	% 9′2/	75.7 %	50.1	0.49	0.59
Insurance											
Pohjola A	3870	4286	83.6 %	13.0 %	3.4 %	22.0 %	77.3 %	% 8.92	56.3	1.33	1.22
Pohjola B	11709	10751	38.3 %	17.5 %	44.1 %	65.0 %	74.2 %	% 9'85	52.2	1.05	0.97
Sampo A	15797	34510	43.5 %	7.2 %	48.3 %	72.6 %	73.8 %	72.7 %	55.2	1.75	1.87
Investment											
Castrum	352	399	96.2 %	3.8 %	0.0 %	74.7 %	74.7 %	60.4 %	48.6	0.78	1.18
Citycon	717	843	91.5 %	3.3 %	5.1%	74.7 %	% 2'92	45.9 %	48.1	1.07	1.11
Interavanti	87	921	61.4 %	36.4 %	% 6.0	63.8 %	76.4 %	38.3 %	50.3	1.17	1.03
J Tallberg-Kiint. B	95	473	84.9 %	14.0 %	% 0.0	66.2 %	62.2 %	69.1 %	50.5	1.52	1.20
Norvestia	403	5127	27.0 %	62.9 %	% 6.9	54.6 %	% 5'02	38.5 %	54.0	0.91	0.90
Polar Kiinteistöt	300	5174	84.0 %	10.8 %	5.1%	71.7 %	% 6.77	51.9 %	47.7	1.07	1.35
Sponda	1781	6821	80.5 %	7.2 %	12.3 %	71.7 %	74.9 %	18.0 %	53.3	0.83	1.17
Technopolis	186	2238	% 8.89	23.9 %	% 2.9	% 8.9%	81.0 %	8.8%	48.9	11.06	23.54
Transport											
Birka Line A	429	2094	54.7 %	38.4 %	% 2.9	51.3 %	2.1 %	2.0 %	57.0	50.87	42.10
Birka Line B	467		64.7 %	32.4 %	2.9 %	22.6 %	4.1 %	4.9 %	54.3	50.86	34.84
Finnair	2015	8377	75.2 %	% 0.9	18.7 %	% 2'89	75.3 %	53.1 %	48.0	1.19	1.12
Finnlines	2376		22.6 %	11.9 %	12.5 %	71.9 %	29.0 %	21.0 %	51.4	1.30	1.40
Silja	621		18.8 %	9.5 %	71.7 %	72.0 %	22.0 %	29.8 %	49.7	0.89	0.95
Viking Line	1676	2046	46.0 %	48.1 %	2.8 %	58.1 %	11.9 %	22.5 %	51.8	43.49	35.78

Number of humber of h	'						privately			
Market value, value, value, value, value, value, value, value, value, value, value, value, value, value, value, value, value, value, values         Institutions Individuals values         Institutions Individuals values         Institutions Individuals values         1.4 % values           o A         3000         4963         74.1 % value         25.5 % value         1.4 % value         25.5 % value         1.4 % value         25.5 % value         1.4 % value         25.5 % value         1.6 % value         27.1 % value         27.1 % value         27.5 % value         27.1 % value         27.5 % value         27.1 % value	'	10 90 11		3	Proportion of individual	individual	registered		Distance ratio	atio
a class         mill. FIM         investors         Institutions         Individuals           a class         546         316         2.5.%         1.4 %           a class         3724         2087         44.1 %         25.5 %           a krija A         1605         514         98.4 %         1.6 %           a krija A         1605         514         98.4 %         1.6 %           a krija B         302         494         93.3 %         6.7 %           a krija B         302         494         93.3 %         6.7 %           a krija B         262         8955         75.5 %         20.1 %           a krija B         262         8955         75.5 %         20.1 %           a krija B         262         8955         75.5 %         20.1 %           a Solution         1673         415         88.2 %         11.9 %           c Services         1673         41.5 %         21.7 %         33.8 %           kennusmies         337         445         88.3 %         33.3 %           c Group         1288         35.4 %         40.8 %         33.3 %           c Group         2051         750         32.5 % <td< th=""><th>20000</th><th>Domestic</th><th>lares own</th><th>ed by Foreign</th><th>Finni</th><th>Finnish</th><th>own less</th><th>Mean</th><th>House-</th><th>Insti-</th></td<>	20000	Domestic	lares own	ed by Foreign	Finni	Finnish	own less	Mean	House-	Insti-
546 316 2.5 % o A 3000 4963 74.1 % o B 3724 20897 44.1 % akrija A 1605 514 98.4 % akrija B 2662 8955 75.5 % cmann B 2662 8955 75.5 % cmann B 2667 11525 67.6 % o 1885 9908 27.9 % r Services 1673 4158 21.7 % kennusmies 37 487 88.2 % kennusmies 37 487 88.2 % conevuokr. B 249 608 34.1 % conevuokr. B 2010 7502 32.5 % o 212	investors	stitutions Ind	. 1	investors	Males	speaking	than one lot	age	holds	tutions
o A         316         2.5 %           o B         3724         2083         74.1 %           akirja A         1605         514         98.4 %           akirja B         302         494         93.3 %           mann B         2662         8955         75.5 %           mann B         2662         8955         75.5 %           mann B         2607         11525         67.6 %           o         1885         9908         27.9 %           r Services         1885         9908         27.9 %           r Services         337         487         88.2 %           kennusmies         337         487         88.2 %           kennusmies         337         487         88.2 %           clroup         249         608         34.1 %           konevuokr. B         20510         7502         32.5 %           donevuokr. B         2036         1270         55.2 %           donevuokr. B <td></td>										
3000 4963 74.1% 3724 20897 44.1% a A 1605 514 98.4% an B 2662 8955 75.5% ann B 2662 8955 75.5% ann B 2507 11525 67.6% avvices olution 1673 4158 21.7% avoing 1288 3548 43.8% avoing 1288 3561 49.5% avoing 1288 369 79.9% avoing 14435 75.6% avoing 14436 75.6% avoing 14446 75.6% a			1.4 %	% 0.96	% 2.99	72.0 %	26.6 %	9.09	1.34	1.30
a A 1605 514 98.4% a B 302 494 93.3% nn A 2662 8955 75.5% nn B 2607 11525 67.6% swices 1673 4158 27.9% solution 1673 4158 21.7% outp 1288 3548 43.8% outp 1288 3548 43.8% outp 249 608 34.1% tor 20510 7502 32.5% ceranes 2836 1351 25.3% ecranes 6443 4442 55.1% 11272 22889 47.9% 11272 22889 47.9% 11272 22889 47.9% 11272 22889 47.9% 11632 10297 73.4% 4668 11435 75.6% 11495 33.3% 11496 594 41.9%			25.5 %	0.1%	29.0 %	74.9 %	11.2 %	29.7	0.36	0.22
a A 1605 514 98.4% a B 302 494 93.3% nn A 2662 8955 75.5% nn B 2507 11525 67.6% swices 1673 4158 27.9% outp 1288 3548 43.8% outp 1289 608 34.1% outp 20510 7502 32.5% outp 20510 7502 32			27.5 %	28.3 %	54.1 %	73.3 %	19.7 %	51.3	0.77	0.74
a B 302 494 93.3 % nn A 2662 8955 75.5 % nn B 2507 11525 67.6 % 2507 11525 67.6 % 2507 11525 67.6 % 2507 11525 67.6 % 2507 11525 67.6 % 2507 11525 67.6 % 2501 248 21.7 % 248 248 24.3 % 249 24.1 % 20510 7502 32.5 % 250 24.1 % 25.3 % 250 24.1 % 25.3 % 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250			1.6 %	% 0.0	53.8 %	77.7 %	32.0 %	53.8	1.85	0.47
nn A 2662 8955 75.5 %  Inn B 2507 11525 67.6 %  1885 9908 27.9 %  1885 9908 27.9 %  20lution 1673 4158 21.7 %  1463 895 17.9 %  20p 43.8 %  24 88.2 %  24 895 17.9 %  24 895 17.9 %  25 908 34.1 %  26 12 1593 39.0 %  4 2333 3201 49.5 %  4 2333 3201 49.5 %  4 2233 3201 49.5 %  4 2233 3201 49.5 %  4 826 1570 55.2 %  6crames 2836 1351 25.3 %  6crames 2836 1351 25.3 %  4 828 1442 54.1 %  11272 22889 47.9 %  11632 10297 73.4 %  4668 16762 55.2 %  140minium 28515 9748 66.4 %  19 576 1069 3.3 %  1 576 1069 3.3 %			% 2.9	% 0.0	58.1 %	74.4 %	20.8 %	54.7	1.96	0.50
nn B 2507 11525 67.6 % 1885 9908 27.9 % 27.9			20.1%	4.3 %	46.1 %	% 9.29	16.2 %	56.3	1.92	1.33
1885         9908         27.9 %           nnvices         1673         4158         21.7 %           olution         337         487         88.2 %           obyy         1463         895         17.9 %           oup         249         608         34.1 %           evuokr. B         249         608         34.1 %           tor         20510         7502         32.5 %           Engineering         215         1593         39.0 %           A         920         1270         55.2 %           ecranes         6443         4442         54.1 %           11272         22889         47.9 %           11272         22889         47.9 %           4668         16762         55.2 %           Iuminium         299         669         79.9 %           ppu         3689         11435         75.6 %           ppu         3689         11435         75.6 %           1         576         1069         3.3 %           1         594         41.9 %			25.8 %	6.5 %	48.3 %	64.3 %	19.9 %	55.5	1.86	1.39
olution 1673 4158 21.7% nusmies 337 487 88.2% 98.2% 98.5 17.9% 1288 3548 43.8% evuokr. B 249 608 34.1% for 20510 7502 32.5% eranes 233 3201 49.5% ecranes 2442 54.1% 11272 22889 47.9% 11632 10297 73.4% 4668 16762 55.2% 4668 1636 69.9% 99.9% ppu 8515 9748 66.4% 979 7506 97000 9700 9700 9700 9700 9700 9700 9			11.9 %	60.1 %	26.0 %	72.3 %	47.5 %	52.7	0.69	0.79
olution 1673 4158 21.7 % nusmies 337 487 88.2 % böyry 1463 895 17.9 % oup 1288 3548 43.8 % evuokr. B 249 608 34.1 % tor 20510 7502 32.5 % Engineering 215 1593 39.0 % 4 2333 3201 49.5 % cerames 2436 1351 25.3 % ecrames 2836 1351 25.3 % ecrames 2836 1351 25.3 % 11272 22889 47.9 % 11272 22889 47.9 % 11272 22889 47.9 % 11632 10297 73.4 % 4668 16762 55.2 % 1468 16762 55.2 % 1468 16762 33.3 % 149 576 1069 3.3 %										
nusmies 337 487 88.2% öbyy 1463 895 17.9% oup 1288 3548 43.8% evouckr. B 249 608 34.1% for 20510 7502 32.5% enta 2333 3201 49.5% ecranes 2836 1351 25.3% ecranes 2836 1351 25.3% ecranes 2836 1351 25.3% eranes 2836 1442 54.1% 11272 22889 47.9% 11272 22889 47.9% 1682 1668 66.4% ppu 8515 9748 66.4% ppu 3689 11435 75.6% 1149 594 41.9%	•	21.7 %	33.8 %	44.5 %	76.2 %		4.4 %	45.5	0.92	0.62
outp         1463         895         17.9 %           outp         1288         3548         43.8 %           evuokr. B         249         608         34.1 %           tor         20510         7502         32.5 %           Engineering         215         1593         39.0 %           A         2333         3201         49.5 %           A         920         1270         55.2 %           ecranes         2836         1351         25.3 %           ecranes         6443         4442         54.1 %           11272         22889         47.9 %           1632         10297         73.4 %           4668         16762         55.2 %           Iuminium         299         669         79.9 %           ppu         3689         11435         75.6 %           1         576         1069         3.3 %           1         576         1069         3.3 %		88.2 %	% 9.6	2.2 %	76.1 %	66.2 %	9.4 %	51.5	0.76	1.44
oup 1288 3548 43.8 % evuokr. B 249 608 34.1 % 1.0		17.9 %	7.4 %	74.7 %	73.3 %	% 2.89	8.8 %	50.9	0.90	0.39
tor 20510 7502 32.5 %  Engineering 215 1593 39.0 %  enta 2333 3201 49.5 %  < 920 1270 55.2 %  ccranes 2836 1351 25.3 %  ecranes 6443 4442 54.1 %  11272 22889 47.9 %  11272 22889 47.9 %  1682 16762 55.2 %  1468 16762 55.2 %  1468 16762 55.2 %  1468 16762 55.2 %  1468 16762 55.2 %  1468 16762 55.2 %  1468 16762 55.2 %  1468 16762 55.2 %  1468 16762 55.2 %  1478 55.6 %  1499 33.3 %  1499 594 41.9 %	•	43.8 %	38.3 %	17.7 %	75.1 %	77.7 %	1.4 %	46.0	1.21	96.0
tor 20510 7502 32.5 %  Engineering 215 1593 39.0 %  a 2333 3201 49.5 %  ccranes 2836 1351 25.3 %  ecranes 6443 4442 55.2 %  11272 22889 47.9 %  11272 22889 47.9 %  11272 22889 47.9 %  1683 10297 73.4 %  4668 16762 55.2 %  1468 16762 55.2 %  1468 14762 55.2 %  1468 14762 55.2 %  1489 8515 9748 66.4 %  149 554 41.9 %		34.1 %	40.8 %	18.5 %	72.8 %	$\alpha$		49.1	1.45	1.32
Engineering 215 1593 39.0 % enta 2333 3201 49.5 % 49.5 % 6cranes 2836 1351 25.2 % 6443 4442 55.1 % 11272 22889 47.9 % 1632 10297 73.4 % 4668 16762 55.2 % 4688 16762 55.2 % 4688 14762 55.2 % 4688 14762 55.2 % 4688 1485 75.6 % 79.0 % 7		32.5 %		29.5 %	% 8.89	73.4 %	3.7 %	48.7	1.42	0.90
enta 215 1593 39.0 % 2333 3201 49.5 %    \$\text{233} \text{2201} \text{49.5 %}    \$\text{2} \text{228} \text{22.8 %}    ecranes 6443 4442 54.1 %    \$11272 22889 47.9 %   \$1632 10297 73.4 %   \$468 16762 55.2 %   Iuminium 299 669 79.9 %   \$109 748 66.4 %   \$109 75.6 %   \$109 3.3 %   \$149 594 41.9 %										
4 2333 3201 49.5 % ecranes 2836 1270 55.2 % ecranes 6443 4442 55.3 % 11272 22889 47.9 % 1632 10297 73.4 % 4668 16762 55.2 % 1040 8515 9748 66.4 % 11435 75.6 % 11435 75.6 % 1149 594 41.9 %		39.0 %	22.8 %		77.3 %	71.0 %		46.7	0.87	1.09
\$\( \) \text{920} \( 1270 \) \text{55.2 \%} \text{6cranes} \)     2836 1351 25.3 \%       \$\( \) \text{643} \( 4442 \) \text{54.1 \%} \\ 11272 \) \text{22889} \( 47.9 \) \text{7.3.4 \%} \\ 4668 \) \text{10297} \( 73.4 \% \) \text{4668} \( 16762 \) \text{55.2 \%} \\ 10minium \) \text{299} \( 669 \) \text{79.9 \%} \\ 10min \) \text{97.6 \%} \\ 11435 \) \text{75.6 \%} \\ 11435 \) \text{75.6 \%} \\ 1149 \) \text{55.4 \%} \\ 14.9 \% \end{array}		49.5 %	29.7 %		66.2 %	% 9.09	% 6′.2	51.4	1.30	1.32
ecranes 2836 1351 25.3 % 6443 4442 54.1 % 11272 22889 47.9 % 1632 10297 73.4 % 4668 16762 55.2 % 299 669 79.9 % pu 8515 9748 66.4 % 3689 11435 75.6 % 176 576 1069 3.3 % 149 594 41.9 %		55.2 %	30.7 %	14.1 %	% 8.99	22.0 %		52.8	1.46	1.40
6443 4442 54.1% 11272 22889 47.9% 1632 10297 73.4% 4668 16762 55.2% hpu 8515 9748 66.4% 149 594 41.9%		25.3 %	12.9 %	61.7 %	75.9 %	65.3 %	13.9 %	49.5	12.14	5.32
11272 22889 47.9 % 1632 10297 73.4 % 4668 16762 55.2 % 1uminium 299 669 79.9 % 1pu 8515 9748 66.4 % 1 576 1069 3.3 % 1 49 594 41.9 %		54.1 %	11.5%	34.4 %	61.1%	% 0.69	8.4 %	51.8	1.19	1.41
1632 10297 73.4 % 4668 16762 55.2 % Juminium 299 669 79.9 % 19u 8515 9748 66.4 % 10 576 1069 3.3 % 149 594 41.9 %		47.9 %	2.7 %	46.4 %	62.7 %	68.5 %	45.9 %	56.4	0.97	1.05
4668 16762 55.2%  Juminium 299 669 79.9%  apu 8515 9748 66.4%  3689 11435 75.6%  1 576 1069 3.3%  149 594 41.9%		73.4 %	22.4 %	4.0%	54.7 %	22.6 %	23.9 %	56.9	1.28	1.33
Juminium 299 669 79.9 % hpu 8515 9748 66.4 % 3689 11435 75.6 % 1 576 1069 3.3 % 149 594 41.9 %		55.2 %	28.2 %	16.5 %	57.1 %	29.5 %	25.9 %	54.7	1.20	1.25
mpu 8515 9748 66.4 % 3689 11435 75.6 % 3.1 576 1069 3.3 % 149 594 41.9 %		% 6.62	16.6 %	3.5 %	% 6.92	% 2.02	14.5 %	20.0	7.12	2.14
3689 11435 75.6% 576 1069 3.3% 149 594 41.9%		66.4 %	8.4 %	25.2 %	73.4 %	77.2 %	29.7 %	51.2	0.91	0.93
e1 576 1069 3.3% 149 594 41.9%		75.6 %	20.5 %	3.8 %	58.5 %	54.9 %	31.6 %	54.9	0.98	1.09
149 594 41.9%		3.3 %	90.1 %	% 9.9	80.5 %	% 9.62	1.9 %	48.4	194.10	0.00
		41.9 %	28.6 %	29.5 %	72.1 %	67.3 %		47.8	0.79	1.28
19977 71.0 %	•		15.3 %	13.7 %	% 0.02	73.1 %	47.4 %	52.6	0.62	0.91
Raute A 122 609 28.5 % 68.4 %			68.4 %	3.1%	75.9 %	77.7 %	20.4 %	20.0	15.10	16.47

							- 1	Proportion of privately			
	Market	Number of privately	Proportion of shares owned by	shares owr	ned by	Proportion of Individual investors who are	or individual ho are	registered investors who		Uistance ratio (municipalities)	ratio Ilities)
	value,	registered	Domestic	stic	Foreign	l colon	Finnish	own less	Mean	House-	Insti-
Share class	MIII. FIIM	Investors		Individuals	INVESTORS	Males	speaking	than one lot	age	Spiou	tutions
Forest Industry											
Metsä-Serla A	1837	2554	94.4 %	5.2 %	0.3 %	64.4 %	% 6.89	% 6.89	55.1	0.72	1.33
Metsä-Serla B	2097	34716	39.3 %	13.9 %	46.2 %	% 2'92	72.0 %	72.0 %	29.7	0.30	0.42
Stora Enso A	12796	8039	20.8 %	2.1 %	47.1 %	64.6 %	75.1 %	75.1 %	51.3	0.97	1.07
Stora Enso R	33083	18214	20.7 %	4.3 %	75.1 %	68.3 %	73.8 %	73.8 %	51.3	0.78	0.97
Stromsdal B	15	1232	18.6 %	76.2 %	3.5 %	% 0.62			48.8	249.33	115.15
UPM-Kymmene	41971	62713	28.2 %	16.3 %	55.4 %	28.5 %	% 2'02	% 2.02	52.5	0.94	0.94
Multi-business											
Aspo	245	1398	40.1 %	54.6 %		% 9.02	72.1 %	72.1 %	49.5	1.15	1.21
Finvest A	215	1327	31.6 %	19.3 %	48.9 %	67.8 %	% 0.92	% 0.92	54.4	0.80	0.60
Finvest B	754	4175	30.2 %	31.7 %		73.8 %	73.7 %	73.7 %	47.4	0.87	0.84
Hackman A	251	2408	21.8 %	53.8 %		64.6 %	% 8.69	% 8.69	48.5	1.12	1.08
Kyro	2571	3027	23.2 %	69.1 %		73.1 %	% 6.69	% 6.69	47.5	1.28	0.80
Lassila & Tikanoja	2097	1248	% 6:09	35.4 %		64.4 %	73.7 %	73.7 %	51.7	1.1	1.37
Energy											
Espoon Sähkö	1591	494	98.0 %	% 9.0	1.3 %	72.9 %	% 8.89	% 8.89	53.5	4.04	2.13
Fortum	18664	55288	88.7 %	% 6:9	4.4 %	71.1%	76.1 %	76.1 %	20.7	0.69	0.77
Länsivoima	1476	826	96.4 %	3.5 %	% 0.0	61.5 %	75.7 %	75.7 %	58.1	50.77	0.00
Food Industry											
Atria A	197		25.8 %	20.8 %	22.8 %	74.7 %	% 8.62	% 8.62	50.1	7.57	8.27
Chips A	713	1057	29.8 %	26.3 %	14.0 %	62.4 %	2.9 %	2.9 %	52.2	39.83	41.10
Chips B	871		40.2 %	29.7 %	30.1 %	60.1 %	18.8 %	18.8 %	50.5	32.50	22.73
Danisco	146		53.9 %	45.8 %	% 0.0	92.9 %		69.4 %	50.5		
Hartwall A	5883		23.0 %	41.5 %	35.5 %	72.1 %		72.6 %	47.4	1.05	0.97
HK Ruokatalo A	220		43.7 %	25.5 %	29.3 %	88.0 %	78.1 %	78.1 %	51.8	0.79	1.74
Huhtamäki v. Leer	6326	_	51.1%	17.0 %		23.0 %		72.0 %	54.0	0.98	0.86
Lännen Tehtaat	419		59.2 %	39.0 %		83.2 %		75.8 %	56.2	43.88	44.56
Olvi A	202		49.2 %	46.1 %		% 6:02		77.4 %	48.8	22.09	16.26
Raisio Yhtymä K	574		19.6 %	% 0.82	0.3 %	79.4 %		73.4 %	299	3.21	2.76
Raisio Yhtymä V	1799	37092	19.2 %	41.7 %	38.7 %	76.1 %	75.3	75.3 %	48.4	4.31	2.56

		Number of				Proportion of individua	f individual	Proportion of privately registered		Distance ratio	ratio
	Market	privately	Proportion of shares owned by	f shares ow	ned by	investors who are	no are	investors who	1	(municipalities)	llities)
Share class	mill. FIM	investors	Institutions Individuals	Individuals	investors	Males	speaking	own less than one lot	Mean	House-	Insti- tutions
Construction							9		o Gis		
Lemminkäinen	1164	1744	23.4 %	75.9 %	% 9.0	73.5 %	73.4 %	73.4 %	50.8	1.15	1.22
Tulikivi A	122	1910	% 9.6	83.9 %	6.3 %	% 6.02	78.3 %	78.3 %	48.7	61.03	47.50
YIT-Yhtymä	1957	3357	77.3 %	13.7 %	% 0.6	75.1 %	73.0 %	73.0 %	52.0	1.04	1.23
Telecommunications & Electro	ectronics										
Aspocomp Group	3799	1302	35.5 %	38.7 %	25.8 %	69.1 %	67.2 %	67.2 %	49.5	1.37	1.41
Comptel	12100	28810	% 6′.29		19.3 %		75.0 %	75.0 %	43.6	0.89	0.85
Eimo A	1349	5299	23.7 %	43.3 %	33.0 %	73.2 %	% 8.92	% 8.92	45.8	8.45	4.89
Elcoteq A	2927	7850	9.5 %	29.6 %	26.9 %	73.6 %	% 9.92	% 9'9/	47.1	0.74	0.87
F-Secure	9102	22459	2.0 %	85.6 %	10.2 %	68.1 %	77.0 %	77.0 %	40.2	1.44	1.39
Helsingin Puhelin E	24475	84356	73.7 %	6.4 %	19.9 %	54.8 %	75.8 %	75.8 %	53.2	2.00	1.66
HPY Holding	26019	257646	36.2 %	23.0 %	% 0.6	45.8 %	75.8 %	75.8 %	55.1	2.04	1.68
Instrumentarium	3537	21355	52.4 %	38.4 %	9.5 %	55.3 %	73.8 %	73.8 %	53.5	1.19	<del>.</del> .
JOT Automation	6371	34931	31.8 %	31.5 %	36.7 %	73.2 %	% 9.92	% 9.92	44.7	6.44	3.95
Keski-Suomen Puh A	5486	12285	40.9 %	43.5 %	% 2.9	51.9 %	81.5 %	81.5 %	52.9	39.56	36.11
Nokia	1552937	73466	% 2'9	4.6 %	88.7 %	61.8 %	72.2 %	72.2 %	47.4	1.01	1.02
PKC Group	646	4283	26.6 %	60.5 %	12.9 %	73.6 %	73.9 %	73.9 %	49.0	12.21	3.96
PMJ automec	1209	6775	16.2 %	63.8 %	18.6 %	79.1 %	% 2.92	% 2'92	43.6	5.45	3.59
Perlos	11848	9974	23.6 %	10.2 %	35.5 %	% 6.69	76.5 %	76.5 %	46.7	2.37	1.42
Stonesoft	5635	7741	11.5 %	67.2 %	21.3 %	76.2 %	77.4 %	77.4 %	45.4	0.91	1.05
Sonera	240052	87825	58.5 %	4.5 %	35.0 %	68.1 %	75.9 %	75.9 %	47.2	0.80	0.80
Teleste	2645	3512	20.7 %	22.1 %	26.9 %	73.6 %	74.0 %	74.0 %	47.1	3.66	1.60
TJ Group	1590	19201	19.3 %	20.8 %	29.8 %	75.3 %	% 9.92	% 9.92	43.0	0.92	0.88
Tekla A	568	1272	77.2 %	22.8 %	% 0.0	78.4 %	77.7 %	77.7 %	41.1	2.60	1.81
Tampereen Puhelin	1686	57071	45.5 %	49.3 %	3.3 %	54.7 %	81.2 %	81.2 %	55.2	10.92	10.44
Vaisala A	1690	2592	33.1 %		13.3 %	67.1 %	75.6 %	75.6 %	49.2	1.14	1.16
Wecan Electronics	481	3715	16.6 %	% 9.9/		% 0.69			44.1	10.65	6.72
Chemicals											
Kemira	4365	13299	74.8 %	7.5 %	17.7 %	73.2 %	74.1 %	74.1 %	53.4	0.65	1.15
Orion-yhtymä A	4583	11826	46.3 %	51.6 %	2.0 %	54.3 %	76.2 %	76.2 %	51.9	1.34	1.27
Orion-yhtymä B	4408	20365	39.1 %	50.3 %	10.4 %	54.8 %	75.0 %	22.0 %	51.7	1.25	0.99
Uponor	4558	3175	63.6 %	11.8 %	24.6 %	68.1 %	67.3 %	67.3 %	52.3	1.04	0.90

							:	Proportion of privately		i	
	Market	Number of privately	Proportion of shares owned by	shares ow	ned by	Proportion of individua investors who are	of individual tho are	registered investors who		Distance ratio (municipalities)	ratio alities)
	7	registered	1 2 1	stic	Foreign		Finnish	own less	Mean	House-	Insti-
Share class	mill. FIM	investors	Institutions	Individuals	investors	Males	speaking	than one lot	age	sploy	tutions
Media & Publishing											
Alma Media 1	1409	1890	% 6:09	14.2 %	24.6 %	59.5 %	79.5 %	79.5 %	54.0	0.79	1.30
Alma Media 2	1971	2751	46.9 %	10.5 %	42.4 %	61.5 %	77.4 %	77.4 %	55.4	0.97	1.39
Janton	909	1551	85.7 %	12.7 %	1.7 %	77.2 %	77.0 %	% 0.77	44.3	1.1	1.21
Keskisuomalainen A	214	789	4.2 %	93.9 %	0.7 %	63.6 %	81.4 %	81.4 %	54.4	8.34	7.28
SanomaWSOY A	2375	1534	45.8 %	53.6 %	0.4 %	57.3 %	75.6 %	% 9.52	53.2	1.72	1.60
SanomaWSOY B	11271	5507	43.4 %	54.3 %	2.2 %	26.0 %	75.4 %	75.4 %	53.0	1.49	1.41
Talentum Oyj	930	3506	37.4 %	12.8 %	49.4 %	% 9.62	% 0.77	% 0.77	47.5	1.05	1.18
Other Industries											
Amer-yhtymä A	4180	11368	23.2 %	23.7 %	53.0 %	57.5 %	75.9 %	75.9 %	49.5	1.12	1.16
Exel	287	820	22.7 %	42.0 %	0.3 %	% 0.9/	71.7 %	71.7 %	47.6	73.57	78.18
Leo Longlife A	82	860	31.3 %	% 9'29	1.0 %	72.6 %		74.7 %	49.6	0.80	0.87
Metsä Tissue	2533	1657	69.4 %	3.8 %	26.8 %	73.3 %	20.5 %	20.5 %	57.3	0.42	0.86
Nokian Renkaat	2076	2778	26.3 %	17.8 %	25.9 %	69.3 %	73.5 %	73.5 %	52.6	14.95	1.05
Rapala Normark	1161	921	2.8 %	1.2 %	% 0.96	76.4 %	% 6.69	% 6.69	45.4	16.51	21.78
Sanitec	3884	16640	75.8 %	13.4 %	10.8 %	58.4 %	28.5 %	28.5 %	55.4	1.17	1.23
Tamfelt K	438	898	48.3 %	49.9 %	1.7 %	2	_		51.6	3.18	3.20
Tamfelt E	713	1620	28.0 %	40.4 %	1.5 %	% 6:09	64.2 %	64.2 %	52.2	3.57	2.26
I-List											
A Company Finland	315		84.9 %	13.5 %	% 8.0	80.3 %	76.3 %	76.3 %	42.6	0.67	0.75
Benefon S	286		31.1 %	50.4 %	18.5 %	81.9 %	75.6	% 9'5'	43.2	9.00	14.30
Elecster A	32	200	47.9 %	36.6 %	14.5 %	75.6 %		75.8 %	46.8	72.61	69.29
Efore A	170		43.6 %	51.8 %	4.6 %	77.3 %	75.6	% 9′5′	45.2	1.00	2.01
Honkarakenne B	135		40.7 %	51.4 %	7.8 %	72.6 %		75.4 %	47.9	3.83	2.10
IIkka-Yhtymä 1	126		47.2 %	48.9 %		74.7 %		80.3 %	59.8	12.61	36.65
IIkka-Yhtymä 2	241		% 8.02	27.3 %		74.4 %		81.0 %	59.6	13.62	32.61
Incap	163		87.3 %	12.1 %		77.0 %		72.7 %	47.6	5.31	3.29
Isko A	139		% 0.66	0.3 %		72.2 %		22.0 %	39.5	25.87	0.00
Kasola A	18		20.0 %	45.3 %	4.5 %	79.8 %		76.1 %	50.3	1.03	0.65
Kekkilä	66	276	65.5 %	34.5 %	% 0.0	74.5 %	74.1 %	74.1 %	47.4	2.31	5.41
Kesla A	33		13.3 %	86.4 %	% 0:0	72.7 %		78.5 %	50.4	241.50	140.23

								Proportion of privately			
		Number of				Proportion of individua	of individual	registered		Distance ratio	ratio
	Market	privately	Proportion of shares owned by	f shares owr	ned by	investors who are	rho are	investors who		(municipalities)	lities)
	value,	registered	ΙœΙ	stic	Foreign		Finnish	own less	Mean	House-	Insti-
Share class	mill. FIM	investors	Institutions	Individuals	investors	Males	speaking	than one lot	age	holds	tutions
Kauppakaari	331	32	% 8'66	0.5 %	% 0.0	73.9 %	78.3 %	78.3 %	41.6	1.83	1.90
Kontram	65	200	26.5 %	72.9 %	% 9.0	80.9 %	82.2 %	82.2 %	48.0	1.51	1.13
Larox B	99	639	29.7 %	% 6′.29	2.0 %	% 6.92	% 2'92	% 2.92	46.9	19.92	16.53
Martela A	264	605	46.0 %	43.3 %	10.6 %	65.7 %	72.6 %	72.6 %	50.5	1.16	1.41
Markk. Viherjuuri	91	521	12.4 %	86.6 %	1.0 %	73.5 %	% 6.92	% 6.92	47.1	0.97	0.76
Marimekko	91	1756	68.3 %	30.1 %	1.6 %	50.3 %	79.2 %	79.2 %	48.9	0.87	0.88
Menire	517	2688	28.6 %	25.0 %	16.4 %	75.3 %	75.3 %	75.3 %	40.3	1.06	1.04
Neomarkka B	205	15963	22.7 %	38.7 %	0.1%	82.5 %	74.7 %	74.7 %	51.0	0.02	0.10
Panostaja A	17	331	10.3 %	82.6 %	% 0.0	% 6.89	79.3 %	79.3 %	47.4	6.49	10.73
Panostaja B	6	2886	13.2 %	83.8 %	0.1 %	% 9.99	% 8.92	% 8.92	43.5	1.48	9.73
PI-Consulting A	80	27	99.4 %	0.2 %	% 0.0	78.9 %		73.7 %	40.2	2.13	7.93
Pohj-K.Kirjap. A	223	488	39.7 %	58.7 %	1.3 %	63.7 %	81.5 %	81.5 %	58.2	70.04	54.73
Plandent A	36	352	60.4 %	36.0 %	% 0.0	57.2 %	70.3 %	70.3 %	50.2	1.24	1.18
Saunatec	125	110	6.2 %	93.6 %	0.5 %	70.2 %	% 0.99	% 0.99	42.3	17.80	0.00
Suomen Helasto	46	425	52.5 %	47.2 %	0.1%	71.0 %		79.8 %	48.5	11.92	12.28
Suomen Spar A	129	333	43.5 %	21.3 %	34.9 %	65.8 %		51.7 %	53.5	0.93	1.01
Suomen Spar K	129	233	15.7 %	% 2'92	6.5 %	58.1 %		32.8 %	59.8	0.92	1.27
SSK S.Sääst.Kiint.	21	345	79.2 %	20.6 %	% 0.0	74.1 %	77.5 %	77.5 %	47.8	15.37	25.00
Turun Arvokiint. A	7	335	78.2 %	16.0 %	4.4 %	71.3 %		78.4 %	49.2	11.10	8.60
Tervak. Puuhamaa	81	165	16.8 %	83.2 %	% 0.0	% 6′.29		72.1 %	39.1	39.11	0.00
Tilamarkkinat-Yhtiö	145	61	98.3 %	1.1%	% 0.0	62.5 %	82.5 %	82.5 %	47.6	6.79	0.00
Turkistuottajat C	118	1882	54.3 %	22.9 %	19.9 %	82.0%	•	41.4 %	54.0	0.18	0.21
Vaahto Group A	33	338	36.2 %	62.9 %	% 2.0	<b>20.9</b> %	75.3 %	75.3 %	49.8	20.61	0.00
Vaahto Group K	30	250	11.8 %	86.5 %	% 0.0		77.3 %	77.3 %	52.2	28.68	0.00
Yleiselektroniikka	35	543	13.9 %	84.1 %	1.5 %	77.3 %	% 0.89	% 0.89	50.3	1.04	1.80
NM List											
Basware	458	(*)	8.6 %	90.2 %	1.2 %	65.1 %		75.7 %	39.5	0.86	1.18
Biohit B	334		29.6 %	% 999	2.1 %	74.7 %		% 6′2/2	45.0	0.99	0.82
EQ Online	1230		51.0 %	27.2 %	21.8 %	77.1 %		80.8 %	37.0	1.13	1.10
Etteplan	183	1508	12.4 %	85.2 %	2.4 %	75.3 %	76.2 %	76.2 %	41.7	4.36	0.00
locore	244		% 8.6	37.4 %	52.7 %	% 6.92		77.5 %	39.5	1.16	1.04
Liinos	343		11.7 %	84.9 %	3.4 %	% 0.62	% 0.77	% 0.77	41.9	3.26	1.88

Number of  Market privately F value, registered  mill. FIM investors Ir 186 1989 300 1967 1089 8090								Proportion of			
Number of  Market privately F value, registered								privately			
Market privately F value, registered mill. FIM investors Ir 186 1989 300 1967 1089 8090	_	Number of				Proportion of individua	of individual	registered		Distance ratio	ratio
value, registered mill. FIM investors 1 186 1989 300 1967 ractive 1089 8090	Market	privately	Proportion of shares owned by	shares ow	ned by	investors who are	ho are	investors who		(municipalities)	lities)
mill. FIM investors 7 186 1989 300 1967 1089 8090	value, r	registered	Domestic	tic	Foreign		Finnish	own less	Mean	Honse-	Insti-
186 1989 300 1967 1089 8090	mill. FIM	investors	Institutions In	dividuals	investors	_		than one lot	age	holds	tutions
300 1967 1089 8090		1989	% 8.9	77.8 %	2.7 %			77.1 %		1.58	1.92
1089 8090		1967	% 8.9	86.3 %	% 8.9			78.4 %		1.17	0.86
	_	8090	% 6.89	10.4 %	19.7 %			75.1 %		96.0	1.08
786 23829		23829	36.0 %	44.4 %	19.6 %			% 9'./_		0.72	0.70
533 2767		2767	7.5 %	92.3 %	0.3 %	% 6.62	% 6.92	% 6.92	42.3	0.98	0.98
193 3298		3298	11.1%	87.3 %	1.0 %			79.4 %		5.09	1.42
276 1886		1886	8.5 %	73.2 %	18.3 %			74.9 %		0.79	0.75